The Effects of Motivations to Resist Social Change and Accept Inequality on Perceptions of System Legitimacy by Brandt, Mark
DePaul University 
Via Sapientiae 
College of Science and Health Theses and 
Dissertations College of Science and Health 
Summer 8-17-2012 
The Effects of Motivations to Resist Social Change and Accept 
Inequality on Perceptions of System Legitimacy 
Mark Brandt 
DePaul University, BRANDTMJ@GMAIL.COM 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/csh_etd 
 Part of the Psychology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Brandt, Mark, "The Effects of Motivations to Resist Social Change and Accept Inequality on Perceptions of 
System Legitimacy" (2012). College of Science and Health Theses and Dissertations. 25. 
https://via.library.depaul.edu/csh_etd/25 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Science and Health at Via Sapientiae. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in College of Science and Health Theses and Dissertations by an authorized 
administrator of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
  
 
 
 
THE EFFECTS OF MOTIVATIONS TO RESIST SOCIAL CHANGE AND ACCEPT 
INEQUALITY ON PERCEPTIONS OF SYSTEM LEGITIMACY 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented in 
Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
BY 
MARK JOHN BRANDT 
JUNE, 2012 
 
Department of Psychology 
College of Science and Health 
DePaul University 
Chicago, Illinois 
  
 ii 
THESIS COMMITTEE 
Christine Reyna, Ph.D. 
Chairperson 
Ralph Erber, Ph.D. 
Joe Mikels, Ph.D. 
Molly Andolina, Ph.D. 
Traci Schlesinger , Ph.D. 
 
  
 iii 
VITA 
Mark Brandt graduated from Concordia University, Chicago in 2007 and received his Master's 
degree in psychology in 2010. His research has been published in peer-reviewed journals, 
including Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Perspectives on Psychology Science, 
Political Psychology, and Psychological Science. 
 
  
 iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................ 1 
Legitimacy and Why it Matters................................................................................... 2 
System Justification and Social Dominance Theories................................................. 3 
System Justification Theory............................................................................ 3 
Social Dominance Theory............................................................................... 4 
SJT and SDT Differences and Similarities..................................................... 6 
The Two Dimensional Model of System Legitimacy: The Resistance to Social 
Change and the Acceptance of Inequality as Two System-relevant Motivations..... 7 
Acceptance of Inequality.................................................................................. 8 
Resistance to Social Change............................................................................ 8 
Are SJT and SDT So Similar?......................................................................... 10 
The Acceptance of Inequality and the Resistance to Social Change as Unique 
Dimensions................................................................................................................... 12 
Two Dimensions of Values.............................................................................. 12 
Two Dimensions of Political Attitudes............................................................ 15 
Initial Evidence for the Two System-Relevant Motivations Effects on System 
Legitimacy.................................................................................................................... 19 
Unique Forms of Prejudice.............................................................................. 19 
Unique Legitimizing Ideologies....................................................................... 21 
Rationale....................................................................................................................... 23 
The Rationale of the Primary Predictions........................................................ 25 
Statement of Hypotheses.............................................................................................. 27 
CHAPTER II. RATIONAL AND HYPOTHESES (STUDY 1)............................................. 29 
Statement of Study 1 Hypotheses................................................................................. 29 
Hypothesis I...................................................................................................... 29 
 v 
Hypothesis II.................................................................................................... 29 
CHAPTER III. METHOD (STUDY 1).................................................................................... 30 
Participants and Procedure............................................................................... 30 
Measures........................................................................................................... 30 
CHAPTER IV. RESULTS (STUDY 1)................................................................................... 35 
Hypothesis I..................................................................................................... 35 
Hypothesis II.................................................................................................... 37 
CHAPTER V. DISCUSSION (STUDY 1).............................................................................. 39 
CHAPTER VI. RATIONALE AND HYPOTHESES (STUDIES 2a AND 2b)...................... 41 
Statement of Study 2a Hypotheses............................................................................... 43 
Hypothesis I...................................................................................................... 43 
Hypothesis II.................................................................................................... 43 
Statement of Study 2b Hypotheses............................................................................... 43 
Hypothesis III................................................................................................... 43 
CHAPTER VII. METHOD (STUDIES 2a AND 2b).............................................................. 45 
Participants....................................................................................................... 45 
Procedure and Measures.................................................................................. 45 
Factor Analysis............................................................................................................ 49 
CHAPTER VIII. RESULTS (STUDIES 2a AND 2b)............................................................. 52 
Study 2a........................................................................................................................ 52 
Study 2a: Manipulation Checks....................................................................... 52 
Study 2a: Hypothesis Testing........................................................................... 52 
Study 2b........................................................................................................................ 54 
Study 2b: Manipulation Checks....................................................................... 54 
Study 2b: Hypothesis Testing.......................................................................... 55 
 vi 
CHAPTER IX. DISCUSSION (STUDIES 2a AND 2b)......................................................... 57 
CHAPTER X. RATIONAL AND HYPOTHESIS (STUDY 3).............................................. 59 
Statement of Study 3 Hypotheses................................................................................. 61 
Hypothesis I...................................................................................................... 61 
Hypothesis II.................................................................................................... 61 
Hypothesis III................................................................................................... 61 
Hypothesis IV................................................................................................... 61 
CHAPTER XI. METHOD (STUDY 3)................................................................................... 62 
Participants....................................................................................................... 62 
Procedures and Measures................................................................................. 62 
CHAPTER XII. RESULTS (STUDY 3).................................................................................. 70 
Manipulation Checks........................................................................................ 70 
Testing Hypothesis I and II.............................................................................. 70 
Testing Hypothesis III and IV.......................................................................... 70 
Additional Analyses......................................................................................... 74 
CHAPTER XIII. DISCUSSION (STUDY 3).......................................................................... 80 
CHAPTER XIV. RATIONALE AND HYPOTHESES (STUDY 4)...................................... 84 
Conflicting System Motivations................................................................................... 84 
Statement of Study 4 Hypothesis................................................................................. 87 
Hypothesis I...................................................................................................... 87 
CHAPTER XII. METHOD (STUDY 4).................................................................................. 88 
Participants....................................................................................................... 88 
Procedure and Measures................................................................................... 88 
CHAPTER XIII. RESULTS (STUDY 4)................................................................................ 95 
Manipulation Check......................................................................................... 95 
 vii 
Hypothesis I: Objective Ambivalence.............................................................. 95 
Hypothesis I: Subjective Ambivalence............................................................ 97 
Hypothesis II: Predicting System Legitimacy.................................................. 98 
CHAPTER XIV. DISCUSSION (STUDY 4).......................................................................... 100 
CHAPTER XV. DISCUSSION............................................................................................... 104 
SJT vs. SDT. vs. 2D-MOSL: Theoretical Contributions............................................. 109 
Conclusion.................................................................................................................... 114 
CHAPTER XVI. SUMMARY................................................................................................. 115 
REFERENCES......................................................................................................................... 117 
APPENDIX A. Study 1 The Acceptance of Inequality and Tradition Pretest......................... 137 
APPENDIX B. Study 3 Manipulations of System Threat and System Competition.............. 143 
 
 
 viii 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1. Quotes from social dominance theorists highlighting the emphasis on the 
resistance to social change....................................................................................................... 9 
Table 2. Quotes from system justification theorists highlighting the emphasis on the 
resistance to social change....................................................................................................... 9 
Table 3. Countries from the European Social Survey and their levels of income inequality 
and gender inequality............................................................................................................... 31 
Table 4. Main effect and cross-level interaction models (Hypotheses 1 & 2) predicting 
system legitimacy in 27 societies............................................................................................. 36 
Table 5. Items measuring the legitimacy of Country A in Study 2......................................... 49 
Table 6. Principle axis factor analysis with oblimin rotation reveals a three factor solution 
for the acceptance of inequality and the resistance to social change items............................. 51 
Table 7. Items from the Symbolic Racism scale (Henry & Sears, 2002).............................. 67 
Table 8. Items from the Economic System Justification scale (Jost & Thompson, 2000).... 68 
Table 9. Items from the General System Justification scale (Kay & Jost, 2003).................. 69 
Table 10. Study 4: Subjective measure of ambivalence.......................................................... 94 
Table 11. Resistance to social change, the acceptance of inequality, the experimental 
condition, and their interactions predicting subjective system ambivalence, objective 
system ambivalence, and system legitimacy........................................................................... 96 
Table 1A. Principle axis factor analysis with direct oblimin rotation reveals two factors for 
the acceptance of inequality and the resistance to social change items. ................................. 140 
 
  
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. The predicted relationship between the acceptance of inequality, resistance to 
social change, and system legitimacy in unequal and equal countries.................................... 27 
Figure 2. Unequal (top panel) and equal (bottom panel) stimuli materials for Study 2a......... 47 
Figure 3. Changing (top panel) and unchanging(bottom panel) stimuli for Study 2b............. 48 
Figure 4. The acceptance of inequality (AOI) only predicts system legitimacy in an 
unequal society......................................................................................................................... 54 
Figure 5. The resistance to social change (RSC) only predicts system legitimacy in 
unchanging societies................................................................................................................ 56 
Figure 6. The effect acceptance of inequality (AOI) on system legitimacy reverses in 
changing and unchanging societies.......................................................................................... 56 
Figure 7. Materials for the racial inequality is the status quo condition.................................. 64 
Figure 8. Materials for the racial equality is the status quo condition..................................... 65 
Figure 9. The effects of the manipulations of competition and system threat on the 
resistance to social change (top panel) and the acceptance of inequality (bottom panel)...... 71 
Figure 10. Three-way interaction between the resistance to social change, the acceptance 
of inequality, and perceive inequality when predicting symbolic racism................................ 76 
Figure 11. Three-way interaction between the resistance to social change, the acceptance 
of inequality, and perceive inequality when predicting economic legitimacy......................... 78 
Figure 12. Study 4: Unequal status quo experimental condition............................................. 89 
Figure 13. Study 4: More equal status quo condition.............................................................. 90 
Figure 14. Study 4: Significant two-way interactions predicting objective system 
ambivalence. Left panel: Interaction between experimental condition and the acceptance of 
inequality. Right panel: Interaction between the experimental condition and the resistance 
to social change........................................................................................................................ 96 
Figure 15. Study 4: Significant three-way interaction predicting subjective system 
ambivalence............................................................................................................................. 98 
 
 1 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
People in the United States desire a much more equal distribution of wealth compared to 
the actual distribution of wealth (Norton & Ariely, 2011), yet there is little public protest or 
support for the redistribution of wealth from the upper social classes to the lower social classes. 
In the social psychological study of justice and legitimacy, it is commonplace to note that people 
appear to be remarkably unconcerned with the amount of inequality in the United States and 
other Western countries, and to puzzle over the perpetuation of inequality. Despite the stalwart 
efforts of activists, politicians, and many ordinary citizens over the last century to rectify this 
disparity, racial, gender, and socioeconomic inequality appears to be firmly entrenched. In fact, 
over the last several decades economic inequality has actually increased in the United States and 
other western industrialized countries (Milanovic, 2002; Saez & Piketty, 2006).  
Two social psychological theories, Social Dominance Theory (SDT; Sidanius & Pratto, 
1999) and System Justification Theory (SJT; Jost & Banaji, 1994), have been developed with the 
expressed collective goal of explaining the creation, enhancement, and maintenance of social 
inequality and unequal social systems. That is, these perspectives explain why people grant 
legitimacy to unequal social systems. The purpose of this paper is to propose and test a Two 
Dimensional Model of System Legitimacy (2D-MOSL). By first distinguishing the meta-
theoretical foci of SDT and SJT, and integrating them into a single overarching perspective on 
the legitimization of social systems, the 2D-MOSL suggests that there exist two system-relevant 
values and motivations that both contribute to perceptions of system legitimacy. The first orients 
people to the status quo. The second orients people to inequality. 
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Legitimacy and Why it Matters 
A key research question of SJT, SDT, and the 2D-MOSL is how unequal social systems 
are legitimized. While the structure of any social system can be maintained by force, coercion, 
and intimidation, this strategy is costly, destabilizing, and counterproductive in the long term 
(Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Tyler & Huo, 2002). Thus, to the extent that a system is to be 
maintained in the long-term, other forms of moral and intellectual support for inequality and the 
status quo must be recruited.  That is, the system must be perceived as legitimate.  
Legitimacy has been defined as something that “is in accord with the norms, values, 
beliefs, practices, and procedures accepted by a group” (Zelditch, 2001, p. 33), so that system 
legitimacy is the experience of the overarching socio-political system as operating in accord with 
accepted norms, values, beliefs, practices, and procedures. When a system is widely perceived as 
legitimate, the exercise of social and political authority is more effective because the authorities 
in the system can draw on the shared norms, values, and beliefs (Tyler, 2006), leading people to 
have more trust and confidence in the system, perceive the system as fair and just, and have 
greater overall satisfaction with the system (Hetherington, 1998; Tyler, 1990, 1997; Tyler & 
Huo, 2002). When people legitimize the system they are more likely to follow its laws and 
regulations (Tyler, 1997; Tyler & Huo, 2002) and are less likely to spark protest against the 
system (Levi & Stoker, 2000), even when the system and its actions (e.g., specific laws) 
disadvantage a person or group (Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003; Tyler, 1997; Tyler & 
Blader, 2003). Legitimacy, then, helps provide support for the system outside of the rational self-
interest of the people operating within that system. The questions that this paper engages involve 
the psychological and motivational forces that compel people to legitimize social systems. 
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System Justification and Social Dominance Theories 
System Justification Theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004) and 
Social Dominance Theory (Pratto, 1999; Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 
1999), building on Marxist traditions, have provided much of the empirical and theoretical 
rationale for the stability of unequal social systems in the social and political psychology 
literatures. In short, both of these perspectives suggest, among other things, that people are 
motivated to maintain and legitimize the current unequal socio-political system.  
System Justification Theory 
System Justification Theory is often used to explain why social systems are resistant to 
change, even when they appear objectively unjust. A central piece to this theory is that “There is 
a goal to maintain the status quo” (Jost, Pietrzak, Liviatan, Mandisodza, & Napier, 2008, p. 592), 
such that people are motivated to defend existing social arrangements and may do so even when 
it is contrary to their own self-interest. The theory originally focused on explaining instances of 
outgroup favoritism, where members of low-status groups stereotype high-status outgroups more 
favorably than their own group (Haines & Jost, 2000; Jost, 2001; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & 
Burgess, 2000; Jost, Pelham, & Carvallo, 2002), and the use of stereotypes more broadly as 
explanations and justifications for the hierarchy of the status quo (Jost  & Kay, 2005; Jost, 
Kivetz, Rubini, Guermandi, & Mosso, 2005; Kay & Jost, 2003; Kay, Jost, Mandisodza, 
Sherman, Petrocelli, & Johnson, 2007). For example, stereotypes of the poor as happy and 
honest and the rich as miserable and dishonest lead people to view the overarching social system 
as more just and fair because the poor are portrayed as having some compensatory benefit (i.e., 
happiness, honesty) to make up for their unequal economic position (Kay & Jost, 2003).  
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People, however, can justify the system in many ways beyond the use of stereotypes. For 
example, when the system justification motive is activated (i.e., the desire to support the societal 
status quo) people are more likely to see the way the world is as the way it should be (Kay et al., 
2009), perceive governmental agencies and institutions as legitimate (van der Toorn, Tyler, & 
Jost, 2011), reject prospects of system change (Banfield, Kay, Cutright, Wu, & Fitzsimons, 2011; 
Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, & Chen, 2007), more firmly endorse the cultural products of their social 
system (Banfield et al., 2011), and endorse ideologies that provide intellectual and moral support 
for the status quo (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). By legitimizing the system people are able to fulfill 
basic epistemic, existential, and relational needs (Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Jost, Ledgerwood, & 
Hardin, 2008). Moreover, system legitimacy can be palliative, such that people who justify the 
system often have greater life satisfaction (Napier & Jost, 2008; Napier, Thorisdottir, & Jost, 
2010; Rankin, Jost, & Wakslak, 2009) and experience more positive affect (Haines, & Jost, 
2000; Rankin, Jost, & Wakslak, 2009).
1
 Because system justification is a motivated and goal-
directed process (Jost et al., 2008, 2010), the justification and legitimization of the social system 
is more pronounced when the system is threatened (Kay et al., 2009; Kay, Jost, & Young, 2005; 
Lau, Kay, & Spencer, 2008), inescapable (Kay et al., 2009; Laurin, Shepherd, & Kay, 2010), and 
when a person feels dependent on the system (Kay et al., 2009; van der Toorn, Tyler, & Jost, 
2011). By specifying when and why system legitimization occurs, system justification theory 
explains why people often see the unjust as just and the unfair as fair.  
Social Dominance Theory  
Social dominance theory attempts to explain the persistence of hierarchical social 
structures, but focuses on the support for inequality and hierarchy rather than resistance to 
                                                          
1
 There are theoretically expected exceptions to this pattern (e.g., Jost & Thompson, 2000) 
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changes in the social system.  Sidanius and colleagues (Sidanius, Levin, Rabinowitz, & Federico, 
1999) assert, “the main corpus of social dominance theory concerns itself with the specific 
psychological, social, institutional, and ideological mechanisms that contribute to group-based 
social hierarchy, and in turn, with how systems of hierarchy themselves affect these contributing 
mechanisms” (p. 92-93; see also Pratto, 1999; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). This theory rests on the 
assumption that in order to accurately understand the perpetuation of inequality, inequality must 
be examined at multiple levels of analysis. Thus, social dominance theory examines how cultural 
and political ideologies (Federico & Sidanius, 2002), the practices of societal institutions (Haley 
& Sidanius, 2005; Sidanius, van Laar, Levin, & Sinclair, 2003; van Laar, Sidanius, Rabinowtiz, 
& Sinclair, 1997), intergroup relations (Henry, Sidanius, Levin, & Pratto, 2005; Levin, Federico, 
Sidanius, & Rabinowitz, 2002; Sidanius, Haley, Molina, & Pratto, 2007), individual differences 
(Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), and evolved predispositions (Navarrete, 
McDonald, Molina, & Sidanius, 2010; Pratto & Hegarty, 2000; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1994) 
all contribute to the exacerbation and perpetuation of group-based social hierarchy (for extensive 
reviews of all these areas see Pratto, 1999; Pratto, Sidanius & Levin, 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 
1999; Sidanius, Pratto, van Laar, & Levin, 2004).  
One key component of the theory suggests that people vary in the extent to which they 
desire group-based inequality and hierarchy, that is, the extent people desire social dominance 
(Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).  Social dominance can be expressed in 
discrimination and participation in group and systemic processes that favor high-status and 
socially dominant groups compared to subordinate groups (Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006). The 
tendency to prefer group-based inequality and hierarchy is often measured with the social 
dominance orientation scale (Pratto et al., 1994) or other measures of anti-egalitarianism 
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(Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, p. 61-102). People who score high on measures of social dominance 
orientation are more likely to support political and cultural ideologies that accept and promote 
inequality (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), as well as prefer public policies that exacerbate hierarchy 
(Federico & Sidanius, 2002; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), show more prejudice towards low status 
groups (Duckitt, 2001, 2006; Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2008), and work in occupations that 
enhance and maintain hierarchy, rather than attenuate it (Haley & Sidanius, 2005; Sidanius et al., 
2003). By incorporating insight from multiple levels of analysis, social dominance theory helps 
to explain why societies are so often hierarchical. 
SJT and SDT Differences and Similarities  
Even though both theories focus on the perception and legitimacy of unequal social 
systems, the theories are not identical. For example, SDT, compared to SJT, highlights 
ideologies and beliefs that can be hierarchy enhancing or hierarchy attenuating, it focuses on the 
perpetuation of hierarchy at multiple levels of analysis, and it posits an evolutionary origin for 
the existence of social inequalities (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; see also Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 
2004; Jost & Thompson, 2000). These differences aside, many researchers suggest that these two 
theories are approximately comparable and use both theories to make the same predictions (e.g. 
Eastwick, Richeson, Son, & Finkel, 2009; Jost, Chaikalis-Petritsis, Abrams, Sidanius, van der 
Toorn, & Bratt, 2012). Moreover, system justification theorists have used measures of social 
dominance orientation to measure system justification (Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Jost & 
Thompson, 2000) and social dominance theorists have argued that SDT subsumes SJT (Sidanius, 
Pratto, van Laar, & Levin, 2004).  I argue, however, that by specifying and differentiating the 
theoretical foci of the two theories it is possible to derive two basic system-relevant motivations 
 7 
that contribute to the legitimization of unequal socio-political systems. These two basic system-
relevant motivations form the foundation of the 2D-MOSL. 
The Two Dimensional Model of System Legitimacy: The Resistance to Social Change and the 
Acceptance of Inequality as Two System-relevant Motivations 
 I propose that SJT and SDT  each represent a dimension of the 2D-MOSL, the focus of 
this dissertation. The 2D-MOSL argues that each theory represents a different system-relevant 
motivation. SJT represents the motivation to resist social change and SDT represents the 
motivation to accept and maintain inequality. 
 System level motivations are those that refer to the systems in which people operate, 
including “the rules and sociopolitical institutions within which people function” (Kay et al., 
2009, p. 422). In research from SJT “the system” has been operationalized as specific institutions 
(e.g., one’s university; Kay et al., 2009; van der Toorn, Tyler, & Jost, 2010), the government 
(e.g., van der Toorn, Tyler, & Jost, 2010), society (e.g., Banfield et al., 2010; Kay & Jost, 2003), 
and even dyadic relationships (e.g., van der Toorn, Tyler, & Jost, 2010), such that the system can 
include any social system that a person happens to be operating in.  Consistent with SJT (Jost & 
Bananji, 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004), I conceptualize system motivations as distinct from 
preferences, values, and motivations to see oneself (ego-motivations) or one’s group (group 
motivations) in a positive and moral light. Ego motivations pertain to the self and include the 
motivations to see oneself as having value and worth (e.g., Steele, 1988). Group motivations 
pertain to important ingroups and include the motivations to see ones' group as positive and 
moral compared to other groups (e.g. Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Ego and group motivations are 
important for understanding the behavior of individuals and groups; however, the thrust of this 
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investigation is on system level motivations that are relevant to the social system a person is 
currently functioning in, especially larger sociopolitical systems.  
Acceptance of Inequality  
The first system level motivation of the 2D-MOSL, most studied by SDT, focuses on the 
acceptance and promotion of inequality. Consider the quotes in Table 1 from key SDT theorists. 
The theme across all of these quotations is that SDT, and the related SDO, is geared towards 
understanding and measuring the desire for social stratification, intergroup inequality, and 
hierarchy. Thus, the system-level motivation most closely associated with SDT is the acceptance 
of inequality. This dimension ranges on a continuum from an opposition to inequality to the 
preference and acceptance of inequality. It may be best represented by measures of anti-
egalitarianism and social dominance. For example, social dominance orientation has been 
described as “a general attitudinal orientation toward intergroup relations, reflecting whether one 
generally prefers such relations to be equal, versus hierarchical, that is, ordered along a superior-
inferior dimension” (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994, p. 742). As such, measures of 
SDO may be the quintessential measure of the acceptance of inequality (cf. Jost, Glaser, 
Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003).  
Resistance to Social Change  
The second system level motivation of the 2D-MOSL, most studied by SJT, is one that 
resists social change. Consider the quotes in Table 2 from the key theorists behind SJT. Across 
these different quotations there is a consistent theme of the resistance to social change and 
support for the status quo. Rather than focusing on inequality and hierarchy like SDT, SJT 
appears to put the focus on the defense and support of the status quo. Thus, the resistance to 
social change dimension represents a continuum that ranges from a preference  
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Table 1 
Quotes from social dominance theorists highlighting the emphasis on the resistance to social 
change. 
 
 “Social dominance theory was developed in an attempt to understand how group-
based social hierarchy is formed and maintained.” (Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006, 
p. 272). 
 
 “SDO has been refined as expressing a generalized orientation towards and desire for 
unequal and dominant/subordinate relations among salient social groups, regardless 
of whether this implies ingroup domination or subordination.” (Pratto, Sidanius, & 
Levin, 2006, p. 282). 
 
 “As such, social dominance theory is the latest attempt at identifying the specific 
processes responsible for the creation, maintenance, and recreation of group-based 
social hierarchies and the manner in which these processes affect one another.” 
(Sidanius, Levin, Federico, & Pratto, 2001, p. 308). 
 
 
Table 2 
 
Quotes from system justification theorists highlighting the emphasis on the resistance to social 
change. 
 
 “System-justification refers to the psychological process whereby an individual 
perceives, understands, and explains an existing situation or arrangement with the 
result that the situation or arrangement is maintained” (Jost & Banaji, 1994). 
 
 “…we suggest that the individual will sometimes adopt a “system-justifying” stance 
whereby an existing state of affairs is preserved ‘at all costs.’” (Jost & Banaji, 1994). 
 
 “Once a given system or regime is firmly in place, people will be motivated to 
maintain its existence and stability.” (Jost, Pietrzak, Liviatan, Mandisodza, & Napier, 
2008, p. 592) 
 
 “The third is “system justification,” and it captures social and psychological needs to 
imbue the status quo with legitimacy and to see it as good, fair, natural, desirable, and 
even inevitable.” (Jost, Banji, & Nosek, 2004, p. 887). 
 
 “In attempting to understand why acquiescence in the face of injustice is so prevalent 
and why social change is so rare and difficult to accomplish, system justification 
theory posits that—to varying degrees, depending on both situational and 
dispositional factors—people are motivated to defend, justify, and rationalize the 
status quo.” (Jost, Pietrzak, Liviatan, Mandisodza, & Napier, 2008, p. 592) 
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for social change to a preference for the societal status quo. Rather than focusing on the 
maintenance of social stratification, like the acceptance of inequality, resistance to social change 
is oriented towards maintaining the status quo and traditional societal practices and values (see 
also Eidelman, Crandall, & Pattershall, 2009; Eidelman, Pattershall, & Crandall, 2010).
2
  
Are SJT and SDT So Similar? 
The close association between the two system motivations in the extant literature may be 
due to the confounding of societal inequality and the societal status quo. The foregoing analysis 
suggests that SJT focuses on the maintenance of the system, which happens to usually be 
hierarchical, and SDT focuses on the maintenance of hierarchy, which happens to characterize 
most systems. Although the maintenance of the status quo and hierarchy are one and the same in 
many situations, they do not have to be. In fact, they may represent two distinct sets of system 
level values and motivations that people adopt and use to reason about the social system.  
One of the defining contributions of the 2D-MOSL is the suggestion that by examining 
these two system-relevant motivations in contexts where the status quo and inequality are less 
confounded it might be possible to disentangle the unique effects and dynamics of these system-
relevant motivations. People who are motivated to resist social change are likely to legitimize the 
social system because legitimate social systems are more stable and less likely to change (Levi & 
Stoker, 2002; Tyler, 1997; Tyler & Huo, 2002). At the same time, people who accept inequality 
may be likely to legitimize the social system because unequal social systems uphold their goals. 
In general, people are more likely to see authorities and institutions as legitimate when those 
                                                          
2
 The resistance to social change is theoretically distinct from the resistance to change (e.g., Oreg, 2003). Resistance 
to social change refers to the broader socio-political system, whereas the resistance to change refers to change within 
a person’s own life. It is feasible for a person to refuse to change their own routines, but still advocate for changes to 
the over-arching political system. Nonetheless, these two constructs are likely related to some degree. For example, 
meta-analytic work suggests that political conservatism and the needs for order, structure, and closure are weakly 
related (r = .30), as are political conservatism and the openness to experience (r = -.35; Jost et al., 2003). 
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authorities and institutions support their values, beliefs, and goals (e.g, Skitka, Bauman,, & 
Lytle, 2009). Similarly, social systems that uphold a person's goals will be more likely to be 
legitimized by that person. This reasoning suggests that, in more equal social systems, people 
who reject inequality and are more egalitarian will be more likely to legitimize the social system 
because these more equal social systems uphold the goals of egalitarians.  
The possibility of egalitarians legitimizing their social system is an effect predicted by 
the 2D-MOSL that is not predicted by current formulations of SJT and SDT. For example, SJT 
theorists argue that the acceptance of inequality (and other similar measures) is a legitimizing 
ideology and that people who score higher on this measure are more likely to support the status 
quo (Jost & Hunyady, 2005), but the 2D-MOSL suggests that in some contexts people who have 
low scores on this measure are the ones who are legitimizing the social system. Moreover, if SJT 
subsume SDT then one would predict that the resistance to social change, the dominate motive of 
SJT, would be a more powerful predictor compared to the acceptance of inequality. By the same 
logic, if SDT subsumes SJT then one would predict that the acceptance of inequality, the 
dominate motive of SDT, would be a more powerful predictor compared to the resistance to 
social change. By examining system-relevant motivations across a range of societies with 
different social structures it may be possible to tease apart the unique effects of the resistance to 
social change and the acceptance of inequality. This will form a more complete theory of the 
legitimacy of social systems that is better able to account for legitimization across a range of 
social contexts and social structures. 
There are several purposes of the remainder of this paper: (1) I aim to demonstrate with 
the extant literature that the acceptance of inequality and the resistance to social change are 
unique dimensions. (2) In Studies 1, 2, and 3 I aim to demonstrate that both system-relevant 
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motivations predict system legitimacy even when taking their shared variance into account, but 
the relationship depends on whether or not the social system matches individuals' goals. (3) In 
the final study of the dissertation I explore a situation where the two system-relevant motivations 
may conflict and produce a psychological state I term "system ambivalence." In total, this 
manuscript will provide an initial basis for the 2D-MOSL. 
The Acceptance of Inequality and the Resistance to Social Change as Unique Dimensions 
The recent study of political ideology has been primarily characterized by a single 
dimension that spans from “liberal” or “left-wing” on one hand and “conservative” or “right-
wing” on the other with the conservative side of the dimension firmly associated with both the 
acceptance of inequality and the resistance to social change (e.g., Jost et al., 2003; Jost, 2006; 
Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008). This perspective has effectively highlighted the predictive power 
of a unitary dimension; however, research on social attitudes and values has consistently found 
two dimensions (for a list of these works see Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). These dimensions 
approximate a resistance to social change and an acceptance of inequality, dimensions used to 
simultaneously indicate a unitary dimension of political ideology by some researchers (e.g., Jost 
et al., 2003, 2007). However, multiple indicators of these two motivations have unique 
underlying traits (and by extension potentially different genetic and cultural bases, Kandler, 
Bleidorn, & Riemann, 2012) and predict unique dependent variables suggesting that by 
collapsing across multiple dimensions researchers may be obscuring theoretically and practically 
meaningful relationships. In the sections that follow I review research indicating that there are 
two dimensions of social and political attitudes from the values and political attitudes literature.  
Two Dimensions of Values   
One area of evidence for the independence of the two system-relevant motivations of the 
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2D-MOSL is the domain of values. “A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of 
conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse 
mode of conduct or end-state of existence” and they often have a motivational component 
(Rokeach, 1973, p. 5), which makes values research especially relevant to the system-relevant 
motivations considered by the 2D-MOSL. Values tell us what we find to be important both for 
the self and for society at large. By examining dimensions of social values it is then possible to 
determine how people think about the important behaviors and outcomes for their society.  The 
study of values in social psychology has converged on two primary dimensions of values that 
approximate the two system-relevant motivations proposed here.   
Rokeach (1973) postulated that values of freedom and equality, especially, were the two 
primary values that served as the foundation and rationale for political ideologies. These two 
values also closely map on to the two system-relevant motivations. Equality is clearly a 
conceptual (though reversed) match with the acceptance of inequality. Freedom may be related 
to the resistance to social change, such that giving people the complete freedom to do as they 
please likely encourages attitudes and behaviors that could be out of step with socially normative 
conventions. Rokeach proposed that variation on these two values could effectively account for 
the differences between major modes of political thought. For example, Rokeach demonstrated 
that the writings of the top capitalist thinker at the time (Barry Goldwater) were characterized by 
low expressions of equality and high expressions of freedom. Communism, as represented by the 
writings of Lenin, was characterized by high equality and low freedom values. Fascism, as 
represented by the writings of Hitler, was characterized by low equality and low freedom values. 
Finally, socialism, as represented by the writings of several socialist thinkers, was characterized 
by high equality and high freedom values. These results show that four major modes of 20
th
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century political thought can be effectively characterized by the values of freedom and equality, 
values that map onto the resistance to social change and acceptance of inequality system-relevant 
motivations. 
Building on the work of Rokeach, both Braithwaite (Braithwaite & Law, 1985) and 
Schwartz (1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990) developed theories and taxonomies of values that 
attempted to sample from a wider range of potential values. While these two approaches differ in 
meaningful ways, using large community samples in Australia (Braithwaite, 1997; Braithwaite & 
Law, 1985) and a variety of samples from all over the world (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & 
Bilsky, 1992) these two approaches converged on sets of values that can be described using two 
different dimensions that are related to the resistance to social change and the acceptance of 
inequality. Braithwaite (1997) describes her dimensions of social values as “security” and 
“harmony”. Security values consist of specific values like “national strength and order,” “getting 
ahead,” and “propriety in dress and manners.” Harmony values consist of specific values like 
“international harmony and equality,” “positive orientation to others,” and “secure and satisfying 
interpersonal relations.” The content of these two value dimensions are also related to the two 
system motivations. Security values highlight the importance of preserving and maintaining the 
current state of affairs (i.e., resistance to social change) and harmony values highlight the 
importance of an equal and harmonious society (i.e., the conceptual opposite of the acceptance of 
inequality).  
Similarly, Schwartz (1992, 1994) describes his dimensions as spanning the continua from 
“openness to change to conservation” and “self-enhancement to self-transcendence”. The 
openness to change-conservation continuum is primarily represented by values such as tradition, 
conformity, and security and closely maps onto the resistance to social change dimension. The 
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self-enhancement-self-transcendence continuum is primarily represented by values such as 
universalism and benevolence and is associated with the acceptance of inequality.  
In summary, across three independent research programs that made use of thousands of 
participants from all over the world there appear to be two primary dimensions of values. All 
three approaches reviewed here postulate additional values, but the important point is that these 
two overall dimensions explain a significant amount of variance among all of the values 
postulated to make-up the system of humans’ social values. The near universal structure of 
human values may motivate individuals to adopt similar values and motivations for the social 
structure at large and suggests that there may be two distinct system-relevant motivations. 
Consistent with this possibility, the two dimensions of values are associated with two dimensions 
of social and political attitudes. 
Two Dimensions of Political Attitudes  
It is assumed that when a person holds a particular motivation they will more positively 
evaluate motivation-consistent attitudes (cf. Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007). System-level 
motivations can also be evidenced in the support for social and political attitudes that help to 
fulfill one’s goals. For example, Ashton and colleagues (2005) asked participants’ opinions on a 
variety of political issues. Across several samples, factor analysis revealed two dimensions. The 
first was consistent with the resistance to social change and was labeled moral regulation at one 
end and individual freedom at the other. This dimension consisted of attitudes about abortion, 
prayer in public schools, the legalization of marijuana, and same-sex marriage. The second 
dimension of political attitudes was consistent with an opposition to equality and was labeled 
compassion at one end and competition at the other. This dimension consisted of attitudes about 
helping the poor and stigmatized minorities, as well as attitudes about the death penalty, defense 
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spending, and immigration. Moreover, these two dimensions were characterized by different 
underlying values, such that the compassion-competition attitude dimension was associated with 
Schwartz’s self-enhancement-self-transcendence dimension (acceptance of inequality) and the 
moral regulation-individual freedom attitude dimension was associated with Schwartz’s 
openness to change-conservation dimension (resistance to social change).  
Other researchers have come to similar conclusions with vastly different sets of attitudes. 
Saucier (2000) sampled over 200 social attitudes and found several attitude dimensions, 
including one related to the resistance to social change and maintenance of the status quo 
(“alphaisms”) and the other related to the acceptance and promotion of inequality (“betaisms”). 
The first dimension consisted of attitudes in support of tradition and religious belief. The second 
consisted of attitudes in support of fascism and ethnocentrism. As such, support of alphaisms 
was strongly related to religiosity, right-wing authoritarianism, and conservatism (resistance to 
social change). Betaisms, however, were strongly related to social dominance orientation and 
Machiavellianism (acceptance of inequality).  
Duckitt (2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009, 2010; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 
2002) has proposed that right-wing authoritarianism (resistance to social change) and social 
dominance orientation (acceptance of inequality) represent two oft-studied, mostly independent, 
social and political ideologies that underlie individual differences in prejudice (see also 
Altemeyer, 1998; Roccato & Ricolfi, 2005; Stangor & Leary, 2006). While SDO has already 
been described, RWA is a set of attitudes that focuses on maintaining traditions and conforming 
to social norms (Altemeyer, 1996), consistent with the motivation to resist social change (see 
also, Jost et al., 2003).  
Research on the underlying personality traits and motivations of right-wing 
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authoritarianism and social dominance attitudes suggests that the two system-relevant 
motivations are not only different in content, but also fulfill different goals (for a review see 
Duckitt & Sibley, 2009, 2010). As expected, RWA is predicted by perceptions of a dangerous 
world, the tendency for social conformity, and the value of order and structure, whereas social 
dominance is predicted by perceptions of a competitive world, power, and achievement 
(Altemeyer, 1998; Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005; Doty, Peterson, & Winter, 1991; 
Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002; McCann, 
1999; Sales, 1972, 1973). This correlational evidence suggests that RWA, and by extension the 
resistance to social change, is associated with goals related to conserving social traditions and 
norms, as well as maintaining order and structure in society—all goals consistent with the 
resistance to social change. SDO, and by extension the acceptance of inequality, however, is 
primarily associated with goals that encourage inequality, such that perceiving the world as a 
competitive place encourages the support for inequality because inequality justifies the 
competition among social groups.  
 Although much of the work on the motivational and personality underpinnings of RWA 
and SDO have been correlational, recent longitudinal studies have confirmed the temporal 
precedence of personality and motivations in driving these two dimensions of social and political 
attitudes. One study examined the role of openness to experience and agreeableness, two factors 
from the Big-Five cluster of personality traits. Agreeableness is associated with tender-
mindedness, empathy, cooperation, and sympathy. Openness to experiences encompasses traits 
like creativity, low cognitive rigidity, and ingenuity. Thus, low agreeableness is expected to 
underlie SDO (acceptance of inequality and low openness to experience is expected to underlie 
RWA (resistance to social change). Consistent with this expectation, low agreeableness predicts 
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increases in SDO (but not RWA) and low openness to experience predicts increases in RWA 
(but not SDO) over a one-year period (Sibley & Duckitt, 2010). Conceptually similar results 
were found over a five-month period that utilized measures of competitive and dangerous 
worldviews, such that competitive worldviews predicted increases in SDO (acceptance of 
inequality) and societal threat (i.e., dangerous worldviews) predicted increases in RWA 
(resistance to social change) (Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007).  
 Experimental research has suggested that situational primes of different goals can 
differentially affect SDO and RWA (and closely related constructs). Manipulations of self-threat 
(Sales & Friend, 1973) and societal threat (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Jugert & Duckitt, 2009) are 
both related to increases in authoritarianism (resistance to social change) and have much weaker 
effects on SDO (acceptance of inequality) (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003). SDO, on the other hand, is 
affected by experimental manipulations of an individual’s social status (Guimond, Dambrun, 
Michinov, & Duarte, 2003; Schmitt, Branscombe, & Kappen, 2003), the presence of competitive 
outgroups (Hunag & Liu, 2005), and the presence of realistic threats from outgroups (Morrison 
& Ybarra, 2008). Taken together, research on the cross-sectional personality and motivational 
correlates, the longitudinal personality and motivational predictors, and the experimental 
induction of competition and social threat provide firm evidence for the existence of two system-
relevant-motivations. Moreover, these studies suggest that theories that postulate unitary system-
relevant motivations, such as SDT and SJT, may be missing important motivations by focusing 
on just the acceptance of inequality or the resistance to social change. A complete theory of 
perceptions of system legitimacy requires a focus on both motivations. The 2D-MOSL fills this 
void. 
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Initial Evidence for the Two System-Relevant Motivations Effects on System Legitimacy 
SDT and SJT have both identified two major avenues through which an unequal social 
system can maintain a sense of legitimacy: stereotyping and prejudice and the adoption of 
legitimizing ideologies. These methods of legitimization also map onto the two system-relevant 
motivations. Because the 2D-MOSL argues that the motivations to resist social change and 
accept inequality and distinct system-relevant motivations, the 2D-MOSL predicts that indicators 
of both motivations will have simultaneous and independent effects in these two domains. In 
contrast, both SJT and SDT would predict that the two motivations are part of the same 
dimension, such that one motivation would be a prominent predictor that obscured the effects of 
the other (i.e., reduce the effect of the other when entered into a regression equation at the same 
time).  
Unique Forms of Prejudice 
Stereotyping and prejudice have often been implicated in both the maintenance of the 
status quo and inequality (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Pratto, 1999; 
Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). By derogating subordinate groups who threaten the status quo, people 
are able to maintain the perception of the system as just and legitimate. For example, Jost and 
Kay (Jost & Kay, 2005: Kay & Jost, 2003) find that complementary stereotypes about women 
and the poor lead people to see the current state of gender relations and the socio-economic 
system as fair and just. Others have found that many forms of prejudice, including modern 
manifestations of racism, are driven in part by an opposition to equality (Brandt & Reyna, 2012; 
Sidanius, Devereux, & Pratto, 1992; Sidanius, Levin, Rabinowitz, & Federico, 1999) and are 
related to a variety of policies that contribute to the racial hierarchy (Brandt & Reyna, 2012; 
Rabinowitz, Sears, Sidanius, & Krosnick, 2009; Sears & Henry, 2003, 2005; Sears, van Larr, 
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Carrillo, & Kosterman, 1997; Sidanius, Devereux, & Pratto, 1992; Sidanius et al., 1999). 
Because both system justification and social dominance theorists attempt to incorporate many of 
the effects of the stereotyping and prejudice literatures into their models (Jost & Banaji, 1994; 
Jost, Nosek, & Banaji, 2004; Pratto, 1999; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), research demonstrating that 
prejudice can be the result of both of the system-relevant motivations is a particularly important 
step in demonstrating the usefulness of the 2D-MOSL for conceptualizing and incorporating 
SDT and SJT.   
Recent research has identified three different dimensions of prejudice (Ashbrock, Sibley, 
& Duckitt, 2010; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007). The first dimension consists of groups who are 
socially threatening, but not subordinate (e.g., terrorists, drug dealers). The second dimension 
consists of groups who are subordinate, but not socially threatening (e.g., mentally handicapped, 
obese, housewives). The third dimension consists of dissident groups who are both threatening 
and subordinate (e.g., protestors, feminists). The two different system-relevant motivations are 
expected to relate to prejudice in different ways. People who want to preserve the status quo and 
social traditions (resistance to social change) should be particularly prejudiced towards groups 
who are socially threatening. People who want to preserve inequality (acceptance of inequality) 
should be particularly prejudice towards people who threaten the hierarchy or are particularly 
low status. Finally, derogating those groups who are both threatening and subordinate (i.e., 
dissident groups) may serve the ends of both system-relevant motivations.  
Consistent with this reasoning, Duckitt (2006; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007) found that RWA 
(resistance to social change) best predicted prejudice towards status quo threatening outgroups 
(rock stars, drug deals) and SDO (acceptance of inequality) best predicted prejudice towards low 
status and competitive outgroups (physically disabled, housewives, unemployed). Both RWA 
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and SDO significantly predicted prejudice towards a group that was both competitive and 
socially deviant (feminists). Using a longitudinal model that spanned six months in time, 
Asbrock, Sibley, and Duckitt (2010) found conceptually equivalent results.  
RWA (resistance to social change) and SDO (acceptance of inequality) can differentially 
predict prejudice of the same group depending on the salience of different aspects of the group 
and different motivational goals. For example, prejudice towards immigrants who refused to 
assimilate was best predicted by RWA (resistance to social change) because these immigrants 
threatened the social order; however, prejudice towards immigrants who assimilated was best 
predicted by SDO (acceptance of inequality) because this group was perceived as more 
competitive (Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2008). RWA is particularly predictive of prejudice 
when characterizations of outgroups are manipulated to highlight the social threat of the 
outgroup (Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009) or when a group's values compared to competitive group 
identity are made salient (Dru, 2007). Taken as a whole, this research suggests that for people 
who are especially concerned with resisting social change, some groups are especially 
threatening. By derogating these status quo-threatening groups, a person is able to help maintain 
the status quo and resist social change. Similarly, for people who are especially concerned with 
preserving and accepting inequality, low status and competitive groups are seen as threatening 
the hierarchy. By derogating these hierarchy-threatening groups a person is able to bolster and 
maintain inequality. 
Unique Legitimizing Ideologies 
 One way people are thought to legitimize the social system and societal hierarchy is by 
adopting different ideologies that provide intellectual and moral support for the status quo and/or 
the hierarchy (e.g., Brandt, 2011; Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Napier & Jost, 2008; Sidanius, Levin, 
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Federico, & Pratto, 2001; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). By adopting these attitudes people are able 
to more easily perceive the system as just and fair, as well as justify the negative treatment of 
low status groups and people who threaten the stability of the system. Many legitimizing 
ideologies are likely to consist of a mixture of the legitimization of both the status quo 
(resistance to social change) and inequality (acceptance of inequality), indicating that these 
legitimizing ideologies serve the ends of both system-relevant motivations (cf. Brandt & Reyna, 
2012). However, if there exist two unique system-relevant orientations, as the previous review 
suggests, then it may be possible that some ideologies serve to primarily resist social change and 
others serve to primarily to accept inequality, allowing people to endorse ideologies that match 
their system-relevant concerns. This is contary to current formulations of SJT and SDT which 
expect ideologies to either legitimize the status quo (SJT) or maintain/exacerbate inequality 
(SDT). 
Two ideologies that can be used to justify the gender status quo and hierarchy are 
benevolent and hostile sexist ideologies (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 2001). Benevolent sexism takes a 
positive but patronizing view of women, such that women are characterized as kind and caring, 
but in need of a man for protection and romantic fulfillment. This ideology represents the 
traditional view of women as complementing communal partners to men and endorsing it may 
indicate a resistance to social change. Hostile sexism takes a negative view of women, portraying 
them as a competitive group to male dominance who use their feminine wile or feminist ideology 
to get what they want from men and endorsing it may indicate an acceptance (or even 
preference) for inequality. As legitimizing ideologies, benevolent and hostile sexism can be 
reinterpreted as ideologies that justify the gender status quo (benevolent sexism) or support 
gender inequality (hostile sexism) because benevolent sexism promotes traditional views of 
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women and hostile sexism disparages women who dare challenge men’s dominant social 
position.  
Consistent with this reinterpretation, Sibley, Wilson, and Duckitt (2007) found that, 
meta-analytically, men’s right-wing authoritarianism (resistance to social change) predicted 
benevolent sexism more strongly than hostile sexism and their social dominance orientation 
(acceptance of inequality) more strongly predicted hostile sexism than benevolent sexism. These 
researchers also found that the underlying personality traits and chronic motivational goals that 
underlie RWA and SDO (reviewed previously) predicted benevolent and hostile sexism in 
theoretically consistent ways. That is, social conformity and perceptions of a dangerous world 
were significant determinants of benevolent sexism. Tough-mindedness and a competitive 
worldview were significant determinants of hostile sexism. Further longitudinal analyses 
confirmed that RWA and SDO were causal antecedents to benevolent and hostile sexism, 
respectively. While this set of studies focused almost entirely on men, they provide some 
evidence that the two system-relevant motivations, and their expression in social and political 
ideologies (i.e., RWA and SDO), have the potential to lead to specific legitimizing ideologies 
that correspond to the two system-relevant orientations of the 2D-MOSL. Moreover, they 
question the unitary focus of SJT and SDT on just the resistance to social change or the 
acceptance of inequality, respectively. 
Rationale 
SJT and SDT have both attempted to explain the persistence of inequality and injustice. I 
have proposed the 2D-MOSL that argues that both theories, despite explaining much of the same 
phenomenon, have different meta-theoretical foci. SDT puts an emphasis on the acceptance of 
inequality and SJT emphasizes a resistance to social change and the acceptance of the societal 
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status quo. These two foci are proposed to represent two distinct system-relevant motivations 
that contribute to system legitimacy. Previous research has demonstrated that values, attitudes, 
prejudice, and legitimizing ideologies all appear to exist on two different dimensions that are 
consistent with the two dimensions proposed here. However, evidence for both system-relevant 
motivations contributing to different forms of system legitimacy could only be inferred from 
studies on ideology and prejudice. If one accepts that stereotyping, prejudice, and ambivalent 
sexism contribute to the perpetuation of the status quo and inequality, as theorists and 
researchers have suggested (e.g., Glick & Fiske, 2001; Jost & Kay, 2005; Kay & Jost, 2003; 
Sidanius et al., 2001; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), then these studies provide initial evidence for the 
2D-MOSL  and the unique effects of the two system-relevant motivations on system legitimacy.  
However, it is not clear that the results reviewed above represent instances of system 
legitimization. Specifically, many of the studies examined the perceptions of ingroups regarding 
outgroups, meaning that many of the effects could be interpreted as group-level, rather than 
system-level concerns. For example, research by Duckitt and colleagues (Asbrock, Sibley, & 
Duckitt, 2010; Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007) on the three forms of prejudice primarily 
sample university students from the high status social group, such that any expressions of 
prejudice may be due to classic intergroup dynamics (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) rather than system-
relevant motivations. Similarly, Sibley and colleagues' (Sibley et al., 2007) work on benevolent 
sexism uses male participants and the results do not appear to replicate with women. Simply put, 
prejudice is not legitimacy. 
The purpose of the proposed set of studies is to demonstrate the unique and interactive 
effects of the two system-relevant motivations on direct perceptions of system legitimacy by 
both low and high status members of society and in nations around the world. By testing the two 
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system-relevant motivations and their relationship to system legitimacy, I aim to bridge SDT and 
SJT, as well as outline the dynamics of the motivational underpinnings of system legitimacy. The 
2D-MOSL contributes to the social psychological study of legitimacy by predicting the social 
contexts where two system-relevant motivations will be associated with system legitimacy. By 
taking the study of legitimacy outside of the unequal social system of the United States it is 
possible to form a more nuanced theory of system legitimacy. 
The Rationale of the Primary Predictions 
There are two primary predictions of the 2D-MOSL that differentiate it from both SDT 
and SJT. The first considers unequal contexts, a type of context that much of the work on these 
two theories has focused on previously. In unequal contexts the 2D-MOSL predicts that both the 
resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality will be predictive of system 
legitimacy. That is, even when using one motivation or the other as a covariate, the 2D-MOSL 
predicts that both will be significant positive predictors of legitimacy. This prediction is 
inconsistent with SJT and SDT. To the extent SJT and SDT theorists argue that their theories 
overlap one another, a simultaneous and independent association would not be expected because 
the shared variance between the two system relevant motivations would obscure the contribution 
of the other.  
The second prediction argues that the inequality of any given context will moderate the 
association between the acceptance of inequality and legitimacy, but not the association between 
the resistance to social change and legitimacy. The amount of inequality in a social system varies 
quite a bit from system to system. Economists have developed various measures of income 
inequality that indicate the extent of the status disparities within a given region (e.g., Allison, 
1978). For example, one measure, the Gini index, represents roughly the ratio of household 
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income held by the wealthiest portion of a region compared to the poorest portion of the region. 
The index can range from zero to 100, where zero indicates that incomes are distributed with 
perfect equality and 100 indicates that resources are distributed with perfect inequality – one 
household in a region has all of the income. No country falls at either of the extremes of the Gini 
index, but countries do show large amounts of variability on the measure. For example, Sweden 
and Hungry have the most equal distributions of income with the Gini index less than 25 in both 
countries, while South Africa and Nambia have the most unequal distributions of income with 
the Gini index greater than 64 in both countries (CIA World Factbook, 2011).  
The variation in equality among countries should affect the acceptance of inequality's role 
in legitimizing the system. Specifically, in countries with greater inequality the acceptance of 
inequality will be a stronger positive predictor of system legitimacy than in countries with less 
inequality because the system in more unequal countries is providing outcomes that are more in 
line with the acceptance of inequality. It is predicted that societal inequality will have no 
moderating effect on resistance to social change predicting system legitimacy. This result would 
suggest that the resistance to social change is associated with the justification and legitimization 
of the system, any system, and that it needs not be equal or unequal.  
The extremes of these predictions are illustrated in Figure 1. The horizontal axis 
represents the resistance to social change motivation and the vertical axis represents the 
acceptance of inequality motivation. The diagonal axes represent perceptions of system 
legitimacy. In unequal countries, system legitimacy is determined by a higher motivation to 
resist social change and a higher acceptance of inequality. In equal countries, system legitimacy 
is determined by a higher motivation to resist social change and a lower acceptance of inequality. 
This latter possibility for equal countries is unlikely to fully manifest in the “real world” because 
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no countries are equal and have at least some degree of inequality. Rather, the relationship 
between the acceptance of inequality and system legitimacy will be positive in more unequal 
countries and less positive (or have no association) in more equal countries. It is important to 
note that in unequal societies the predictions made by the 2D-MOSL are similar (but not 
identical) to the predictions made by SDT and SJT, but that the predictions for the more equal 
societies are not easily incorporated into previous models that have not seriously considered the 
role of societal context and are unique to the 2D-MOSL. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Figure 1 
The predicted relationship between the acceptance of inequality, resistance to social change, and 
system legitimacy in unequal and equal countries. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Statement of Hypotheses 
Many hypotheses can be derived from the 2D-MOSL. The first primary prediction 
derived from the previous analysis is that both system-relevant motivations will predict increased 
system legitimacy in unequal social systems because the outcomes of the system match the 
motivational goals of people who accept inequality and perceiving the system as legitimate helps 
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to preserve the status quo and resist social change. This prediction is unique from SJT and SDT 
because it suggests that both motivations are at work, rather than just a single unity motivation.  
The second primary prediction suggests that the acceptance of inequality will be 
moderated by the inequality of the status quo such that the acceptance of inequality will be 
positively associated with legitimacy  in unequal contexts, but unrelated or negatively associated 
with legitimacy in more equal contexts. The resistance to social change, however, will be 
positively associated with legitimacy no matter the inequality of the social context. This 
particular prediction more firmly distinguishes the 2D-MOSL from previous perspectives that do 
not anticipate the possibility that egalitarians will legitimize the social system. 
These two primary predictions will be tested in Studies 1 ─ 3.  In Study 4 these primary 
hypotheses, but also an extension of the 2D-MOSL will be examined.  Throughout secondary 
hypotheses designed to test the distinctiveness of the two system-relevant motivations will be 
introduced. 
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CHAPTER II 
RATIONALE AND HYPOTHESES (STUDY 1) 
 Study 1 starts with the primary hypotheses of the 2D-MOSL: The acceptance of 
inequality and the resistance to social change will predict system legitimacy in unequal social 
systems, but that the acceptance of inequality will not be related (or negatively related) in equal 
social systems. This hypothesis is tested with representative data from 27 countries who are a 
part of the European Social Survey and objective measures of inequality in a particular country. 
This allows me to test the primary predictions of the 2D-MOSL and people's lived experiences 
with inequality. 
Statement of Study 1 Hypotheses 
 The preceding review and rationale suggests four specific hypotheses that will be tested 
in this first study. Hypothesis I represents the primary prediction of the model, whereas the other 
three hypotheses represent secondary predictions of the model. 
 Hypothesis I. Both the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality will 
be positively related to, and predict unique variance in, system legitimacy in unequal countries.  
 Hypothesis II. Societal inequality will increase the strength of the relationship between 
the acceptance of inequality and system legitimacy, but it is not expected to moderate the 
association between the resistance to social change and system legitimacy. 
 Thus, Study 1 will provide an initial test of two hypotheses derived from previous 
research and the 2D-MOSL. Both of these  predictions distinguish the 2D-MOSL from SJT and 
SDT because the results consistent with both hypotheses will indicate that the two motivations 
are independent of one another.  
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CHAPTER III 
METHOD (STUDY 1) 
Participants and Procedure 
 Data from 71,674 participants (49.7% men, 50.3% women; M age = 47.2 years, SD = 
17.2) who lived in the 27 countries who participated in the first through third waves of the 
European Social Survey (ESS) were analyzed. The European Social Survey (ESS) is a biennial 
survey of European countries that uses face-to-face interviews to obtain samples representative 
of the participating countries. The list of the countries and the sample size for each country is 
available in Table 3. 
Measures 
 Primary Predictor Variables: Tradition and Equality Values. The measures of the two 
system motivations are part of a larger section of the survey designed to measure Schwartz’s 
model of values (1992). The preamble for this section reads, “Now I will briefly describe some 
people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you.” 
To measure the resistance to social change an item designed to measure traditionalism was used. 
This item is not a perfect measure of the resistance to social change; however, other researchers 
have used it to operationalize the resistance to social change (Thorisdottir, Jost, Liviatan, & 
Shrout, 2007). This item reads, “Tradition is important to her/him. She/he tries to follow the 
customs handed down by her/his religion or her/his family.” To measure the acceptance of 
inequality, an item designed to measure support for equality was used (Thorisdottir et al., 2007). 
This item reads, “She/he thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated 
equally. She/he believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life.” These items are 
measured on a six-point scale from very much like me to not at all like me. Items were rescored 
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Table 3 
Countries from the European Social Survey and their levels of income inequality and gender inequality. 
 Country 
Sample 
Size 
Gini Index 
Gender Inequality 
Index 
Acceptance of 
Inequality b(SE) 
Tradition 
b(SE) 
1 Sweden 4039 23 0.212 -.17(.02)*** .02(.02) 
2 Hungary 921 24.7 0.401 .04(.05) .02(.05) 
3 Norway 4560 25 0.234 -.07(.02)*** .01(.02) 
4 Luxembourg 707 26 0.345 -.04(.06) .09(.04)* 
5 Austria 3361 26 0.3 -.01(.03) .14(.02)*** 
6 Slovakia 1550 26 0.352 .03(.05) .05(.04) 
7 Czech Republic 2059 26 0.33 .07(.04)* .07(.03)* 
8 Finland 4439 26.8 0.248 -.08(.02)*** .06(.02)*** 
9 Germany 5916 27 0.24 -.004(.02) .09(.02)*** 
10 Belgium 3822 28 0.236 -.02(.03) .08(.02)*** 
11 Slovenia 2465 28.4 0.336 -.03(.04) .05(.03) 
12 Cyprus 661 29 0.284 -.13(.09) -.15(.08)* 
13 Denmark 3530 29 0.209 -.01(.02) .06(.02)*** 
14 Ireland 1634 29.3 0.344 .04(.04) .10(.03)*** 
15 Netherlands 4873 30.9 0.174 -.06(.02)** .03(.02) 
16 Italy 797 32 0.251 .04(.06) .03(.05) 
17 Spain 2557 32 0.28 .06(.03)* .06(.02)* 
18 France 2952 32.7 0.26 -01(.03) .07(.02)*** 
19 Greece 2540 33 0.317 -.06(.05) .10(.04)* 
20 Bulgaria 669 33.5 0.412 .004(.06) -.15(.07)* 
21 Switzerland 4095 33.7 0.228 -.07(.02)** .11(.02)*** 
22 United Kingdom 4170 34 0.369 -.11(.02)*** -.03(.02) 
23 Poland 3522 34.9 0.325 .02(.03) .04(.03) 
24 Portugal 2283 38.5 0.303 .08(.03)*** .03(.03) 
25 Israel 1463 39.2 0.332 .06(.04) .004(.03) 
26 Turkey 1161 41 0.585 .06(.06) .11(.06)+ 
27 Russian Federation 928 42.2 0.465 .05(.05) -.01(.05) 
Note: Countries are ranked according to the Gini index. Acceptance of inequality and Tradition slopes (standard errors) are from 
multiple regression equations run in each country individually and including all of the demographic and control variables predicting 
system legitimacy. +p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
 
 32 
so that higher scores indicated more acceptance of inequality and more support for tradition. See 
Appendix A for the results of a pretest of these two items. 
Societal-Level Predictor Variables: The Gini Index and Gender Inequality Index. To 
measure societal-level inquality I used a measure commonly used by social psychologists and 
other researchers to assess societal-level income inequality: the Gini index (Henry, 2009; Napier 
& Jost, 2008). This index represents the ratio of household income held by the wealthiest portion 
of a region compared to the portion held by the poorest portion of the region. The index can 
range from zero to 100 with higher scores indicating higher levels of inequality. Values for this 
measure are in Table 3 and were obtained from the CIA World Factbook (2011).  
I also used a second measure of inequality, the gender inequality index, as reported by the 
United Nations Human Development Report (2010). This measure of gender inequality is 
composed of three major indicators of the disadvantage faced by women throughout the world. 
The first component is labor market participation. The second component is empowerment and 
consists of women’s education attainment and parliamentary representation. The third 
component is reproductive health. Higher numbers indicate greater gender inequality and the 
values for this index can be found in Table 3. 
Outcome Variable: System Legitimacy. In social psychological research there have been 
three primary methods for assessing system legitimacy. One uses participants responses to 
measures of prejudice, stereotyping, or legitimizing ideologies that the researchers assume 
represent system legitimizing tendencies (Glick & Fiske, 2001; Jost & Kay, 2005; Kay & Jost, 
2003; Sidanius et al., 2001; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). The second uses scales that measure the 
justification of the system in general or the economic or political systems (Kay & Jost, 2003; Jost 
et al., 2010). These scales contain items such as “The main concern of our presidents has almost 
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always been the public good” and “The way the free market system operates in the United States 
is fair” among many others. The third builds on the work of political philosophers and empirical 
studies aimed at understanding the underpinnings of the legitimacy of authorities (Tyler, 2006). 
From this perspective, measures of satisfaction with the system, trust in the system, the perceived 
fairness of the system, and willingness to follow the orders of system leaders are used to index 
system legitimacy (Tyler & Huo, 2002; van der Toorn, Tyler, & Jost, 2010). This latter approach 
mimics the approach used in political science (e.g., Weatherford, 1992) and more directly 
captures the essence of the system justification scales (cf. Jost et al., 2010). 
Several items are available in the ESS that can be used to measure perceptions of system 
legitimacy based on the third approach to measuring system legitimacy described above. These 
items are similar in form and content to the items used by Tyler in his study of the trust and 
legitimacy of the government and government agencies (Tyler & Huo, 2002) and recent work 
from the perspective of system justification (van der Toorn, Tyler, & Jost, 2010). Three items 
assess satisfaction with the nation’s economy, the nation’s government, and how democracy 
works in the nation. The item measuring satisfaction with the economy reads, “On the whole 
how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in [country]?” The item measuring 
satisfaction with the nation’s government reads, “Now thinking about the [country] government, 
how satisfied are you with the way it is doing its job?” The item measuring satisfaction with 
democracy in the country reads “And on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way 
democracy works in [country]?” These three items were all measured on an eleven-point scale 
ranging from extremely dissatisfied to extremely satisfied. Three measures assessed trust in 
important national political and legal institutions. The interviewer asked, “Please tell me on a 
score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do 
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not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust.” On this eleven-point scale, 
participants indicated their trust in the country’s parliament, the legal system, and the police. 
These six items created a highly reliable scale (α = .85). 
Control Variables. Age, political affiliation, income, education, minority status, and 
gender were included as control variables. Political affiliation is measured on an eleven-point 
scale ranging from the politically left to the politically right and is included to rule out judgments 
of the system based on partisan decision-making. Income in each country was measured on the 
same twelve-point scale with ranges of incomes in Euros demarking each scale point. Education 
was measured on a five-point scale ranging from less than secondary to higher tertiary education. 
Gender (0 = women, 1 = men) and minority status (0 = member of minority, 1 = member of 
majority) were measured with participants’ self-reports. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS (STUDY 1) 
 The data for Study 1 exist at two levels of analysis: The individual level and the societal 
level. To analyze this multi-level data I estimated several multi-level models with MPlus version 
6.11 using maximum likelihood estimation and robust standard errors (Muthen & Muthen, 
2010). In all of the multi-level models, the individual level predictors and control variables were 
mean centered within each country because I am interested in the impact of the individual level 
predictors on the outcome variables (Enders & Tofighi, 2007). The societal-level predictors were 
also mean centered.  
 Preliminary ordinary least squares regression analyses were conducted in each individual 
country. System legitimacy was regressed onto the acceptance of inequality, tradition, the 
measures of social status, and the control variables in each country. The outcomes of these 
analyses can be found in the right most two columns of Table 3. As can be seen, tradition was 
consistently positively associated with system legitimacy. The results for the acceptance of 
inequality were more mixed. In several countries a greater acceptance of inequality was 
associated with less system legitimacy.  
Hypothesis I 
I predicted that both the acceptance of inequality and tradition would predict unique 
variance in system legitimacy. Models 1 and 2 in Table 4 test this prediction. With or without the 
inclusion of the measures of social status and control variables, the acceptance of inequality was 
not significantly associated with system legitimacy. Consistent with predictions more support for 
tradition was associated with higher levels of system legitimacy in both models with or without 
the control variables. 
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Table 4  
 
Main effect and cross-level interaction models (Hypotheses 1 & 2) predicting system legitimacy in 27 societies. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 b(SE) b(SE) b(SE) b(SE) 
Level 1 Main Effects     
   Inequality -.01 (.02) -.03(.02)+ -.01 (.01) -.02 (.01) 
   Tradition .05 (.01)*** .05 (.01)*** .06 (.01)*** .05 (.01)*** 
   Education -- .11 (.02)*** .11 (.02)*** .11 (.02)*** 
   Income -- .07 (.01)*** .07 (.01)*** .07 (.01)*** 
   Minority -- -.03 (.08) -.03 (.08) -.03 (.08) 
   Gender -- .14 (.03)*** .14 (.03)*** .14 (.03)*** 
   Age -- .002 (.001)+ .002 (.001)+ .002 (.001)+ 
   Ideology -- .08 (.02)*** .08 (.02)*** .08 (.02)*** 
Level 2 Main Effects     
   Gini Index -- -- -.07 (.04)+ -- 
   Gen. Inequality Index -- -- -- -4.88 (3.11) 
Cross Level Interactions     
   Gini*Inequality -- -- .01 (.003)* -- 
   Gini*Tradition -- -- .003 (.004) -- 
   Gen. Inq.*Inequality -- -- -- .44 (.13)*** 
   Gen. Inq.*Tradition -- -- -- .32 (.32) 
 
Note: Inequality = the acceptance of inequality. Gen. Inq. = Gender Inequality Index.  Minority was coded such that minority member 
= 0 and majority member = 1. Gender was coded so that women = 0 and men = 1. +p<.10, *p<.05, p<.01, p<.001. 
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Hypothesis II 
 The second hypothesis predicts that the association between the acceptance of inequality 
and system legitimacy will be positive in unequal countries and weaker (or even negative) in 
more equal countries. This hypothesis was tested using both the Gini index and the Gender 
Inequality Index in Models 3 and 4 of Table 4. 
 Consistent with my hypothesis, there was a significant cross-level interaction between the 
Gini index and the acceptance of inequality (Table 4, Model 3) and the Gender Inequality Index 
and the acceptance of inequality (Table 4, Model 4). The interactions were decomposed by 
reanalyzing the models at one standard deviation above and below the Gini index  and Gender 
Inequality Index mean. Consistent with predictions, in unequal countries the acceptance of 
inequality was significantly (or marginally significantly) positively associated with system 
legitimacy (Gini index model: b = .03, SE = .02, p = .09; Gender Inequality Index model: b = 
.03, SE = .02, p =.03). In more equal countries, the acceptance of inequality was significantly 
negatively associated with system legitimacy (Gini index model: b = -.04, SE = .02, p = .04; 
Gender Inequality Index model: b = -.04, SE = .02, p =.01). Importantly, the measures of societal 
inequality did not significantly interact with tradition, suggesting that only the association 
between the system level motivation of the acceptance of inequality and system legitimacy varies 
depending on the inequality of the status quo. 
 Additionally, consistent with the idea that legitimizing the system is in the best interest of 
people with high social status (e.g.,  Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), people who had higher incomes, 
who were more educated, and  male were more likely to legitimize the system compared to their 
lower income, less educated,  and female counterparts. Consistent with the idea that right-wing 
ideologies are system justifying ideologies (Jost et al., 2003), people who identified with right-
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wing ideology were more likely to legitimize the system than left-wing ideology. 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION (STUDY 1) 
 The 2D-MOSL asserts that the acceptance of inequality and the resistance to social 
change are two independent system-relevant motivations. Building on this assertion, I developed 
two hypotheses that were tested with data from 27 different countries. The first hypothesis 
predicted that both the acceptance of inequality and tradition would predict unique variance in 
system legitimacy in unequal countries. Although tradition was consistently associated with 
system legitimacy, the acceptance of inequality was not a significant predictor (i.e. there was no 
main effect). Importantly, and consistent prediction that the inequality of the status quo matters, 
acceptance of inequality significantly interacted with the measures of societal inequality to 
predict legitimacy. Consistent with the 2D-MOSL, in unequal countries the acceptance of 
inequality was associated with more system legitimacy, but in more equal countries the 
acceptance of inequality was associated with less system legitimacy. That is, in more equal 
countries the acceptance of inequality was not a system legitimizing motivation, but rather it 
appeared to be a system delegitimizing motivation. These results provide support for the primary 
predictions of the 2D-MOSL because both motivations were associated with legitimacy in 
unequal countries and the association for the acceptance of inequality differed predictably 
depending on the inequality of the status quo. 
 These results are consistent with the 2D-MOSL, but cannot be explained by current 
formulations of SJT and SDT, which predict a single unitary dimension. Thus, Study 1 found 
support for the primary predictions of the 2D-MOSL in representative data from a variety of 
European countries. The second study is designed to further test the role of the societal status 
quo.  
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 In the pretest for the first study another pattern of results emerged that provides support 
for the idea that the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality are distinct 
system-relevant motivations. Specifically, exploratory factor analysis revealed that two measures 
designed to measure the two system-relevant motivations loaded onto two separate factors. The 
factors were correlated, but this pattern of item loadings indicates that they are not identical 
motivations.   
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CHAPTER VI 
RATIONALE AND HYPOTHESES (STUDIES 2a and 2b) 
The first study was designed to provide initial evidence for the theory from a large and 
diverse sample; however it is impossible to completely rule out motives of self-interest and there 
may be additional relevant values, social circumstance, and perceptions of the society that cannot 
be anticipated. Moreover, the measures used in the first study (e.g., tradition and inequality 
values) were adopted because they were close approximations of the constructs of interest.; 
however, more robust measures that more closely tap into the system-relevant motivations will 
be helpful in determining the robustness of the predictions made by the 2D-MOSL. Studies 2a 
and 2b are two conceptually similar studies that were designed to test the primary hypotheses 
and rationale of the 2D-MOSL.  
Specifically, Study 2a aims to test the predictions that the acceptance of inequality and 
the resistance to social change will both positively predict legitimacy, but that the acceptance of 
inequality will be moderated by the inequality of the status quo. Study 2b aims to test the 
rationale for the primary predictions of the 2D-MOSL. The 2D-MOSL argues that people who 
accept inequality legitimize social systems that match their goals, so that they see social systems 
as legitimate when they are unequal and illegitimate when they are equal. If this rationale is 
correct, then in social systems that more clearly represent the goals of people who resist social 
change, the resistance of social change should be associated with legitimacy, but in contexts that 
less clearly support the resistance to social change the resistance to social change should be less 
clearly related. This pattern of results suggests that people legitimize social systems that match 
their goals. This is an important point to demonstrate because it bolsters the rationale of the 
primary predictions of the 2D-MOSL. 
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Studies 2a and 2b both use of a variation on the hypothetical society paradigm that has 
been used effectively by researchers interested in perceptions of social justice (Mitchell & 
Tetlock, 2009). This paradigm asks participants their impressions about a hypothetical society 
that is designed to represent various societal aspects of interest. For example, Mitchell and 
colleagues (Mitchell, Tetlock, Mellers, & Ordonez, 1993) manipulated the meritocracy, average 
income, and income inequality in hypothetical society scenarios in order to examine how people 
make trade-offs between overall income and inequality (see also Michelbach, Scott, Matland, & 
Bornstein, 2003; Mitchell & Tetlock, 2006; Mitchell, Tetlock, Newman, & Lerner, 2003; Scott, 
Matland, Michelbach, & Bornstein, 2001; for a review see Mitchell & Tetlock, 2009). When 
judging these hypothetical societies, participants are asked not to imagine themselves as a part of 
the society, but rather as an objective outside observer. In the current studies, participants will be 
asked to imagine they are a part of the society because both system justification and social 
dominance theories are explicitly concerned with people’s perceptions of the societies and 
systems they are a part of. More importantly for my purposes, by using the hypothetical societies 
paradigm it is possible to experimentally design societies that vary on theoretically meaningful 
dimensions that do not rely on participants’ subjective assessment of their own current 
circumstances or adequate variation among real societies. 
In Study 2a the hypothetical society is manipulated to represent a society with either 
more or less unequal distribution of incomes. The average income in each society remains the 
same, but the variability in the wealth differs. This manipulation allowed me to conceptually 
replicate the interaction between societal inequality and the acceptance of inequality from Study 
1 in an experimental context. If SJT and SDT theorists are correct in asserting that their theories 
subsume one another then we would not expect measures of the two motivations to (a) both 
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predict legitimacy when entered into the same equation that controls for their correlation and (b) 
the acceptance of inequality to interact differently with the status quo than the resistance to social 
change. Although both SJT and SDT do not predict these effects the 2D-MOSL does. 
Study 2b is designed to test the underlying rationale of Study 2a. If people who accept 
inequality are legitimizing unequal social systems because they fulfill their system-relevant 
goals, then it should also be the case that societies that vary on a dimension of change should 
moderate the association between the resistance to social change and legitimacy. That is, it 
should be possible to manipulate a hypothetical society so that it is either a match or a mismatch 
for the goals of people who resist social change. Thus, in Study 2b the hypothetical society is 
manipulated to represent a society that either rarely, if ever, changes their social attitudes or one 
that has ever evolving social attitudes.  After reading about one of these societies, participants in 
both Studies 2a and 2b are asked to judge the perceived legitimacy of the hypothetical society.   
Statement of Study 2a Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis I. The acceptance of inequality will interact with societal inequality to predict 
system legitimacy. Specifically, the acceptance of inequality will predict increased system 
legitimacy in the more unequal society; however, in the less unequal society the acceptance of 
inequality will be a weaker predictor of increased system legitimacy and could potentially even 
predict decreases in perceptions of system legitimacy.   
 Hypothesis II. The resistance to social change will predict more legitimacy no matter the 
inequality present in the society.  
Statement of Study 2b Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis III. Resistance to social change will predict increased system legitimacy in 
the rarely changing society and will more weakly or negatively predict system legitimacy in the 
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ever-changing society. The acceptance of inequality will play a less substantial role. 
Thus, Studies 2a and 2b provide the opportunity to replicate several of the predictions of 
Study 1 in an experimental context, as well as expand the analysis to include societal variation in 
the resistance to social change. 
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CHAPTER VII 
METHOD (STUDIES 2a AND 2b) 
 The experimental methods used in Studies 2a and 2b are largely similar and are described 
together. Any deviations of one study from the other is explicitly mentioned. 
Participants 
  Study 2a included 119 participants (46 men, 72 women, 1 no response; M age = 34.0, SD 
= 11.95). The participants came from a variety of educational backgrounds (3 No degree earned, 
35 High school degree, 18 Associated degree, 48 Bachelors degree, 11 Masters degree, 3 
Doctoral degree). Study 2b included 104 participants (56 men, 45 women, 2 no response; M age 
= 34.5, SD = 13.1). The participants came from a variety of educational backgrounds (2 No 
degree earned, 35 High school degree, 20 Associated degree, 32 Bachelors degree, 13 Masters 
degree, 1 Doctoral degree). In both samples, participants were recruited from Amazon.com's 
Mechanical Turk service where people who are willing to complete short tasks (such as a survey) 
for a small fee can find these short tasks (for a review of this method see e.g., Buhrmester, 
Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Mason & Suri, in press).  
Procedure and Measures 
 Each participant completed measures of the resistance to social change and the 
acceptance of inequality. The resistance to social change measure consists of the same 7-items 
used in the Study 1 pretest (see Appendix A). The items were averaged together and created a 
highly reliable scale in both studies (Study 2a α = .88,  Study 2b α = .89). The acceptance of 
inequality was measured with the 16-item social dominance orientation scale described in the 
Study 1 pretest (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and it created a highly reliable scale 
(Study 2a α =  .94, Study 2b α = .92).   
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 Participants in Study 2a were randomly assigned to read about a hypothetical society that 
was more or less unequal. In both societies the average income was $68,200; however the 
variability in the amount of wealth differed significantly. In the high inequality society the 
percentage of wealth owned by each wealth quintile was 0.1%, 0.2%, 4%, 11%, and 84%. Even 
though this wealth distribution is similar to the distribution in the United States, most Americans 
see this distribution as unequal (Norton & Airley, 2011). In the low inequality society the 
percentage of wealth owned by each wealth quintile was 10%, 15%, 18%, 21%, and 36%. The 
scenarios used Mitchell and colleagues, work on hypothetical societies and judgments of social 
justice were used to guide the creation of these societies (Mitchell et al., 1993, 2003). Next to 
each description of the society was a pie chart displaying the wealth distribution. The scenarios 
and accompanying pie chart can be found in Figure 2. 
 Participants in Study 2b were randomly assigned to read about a hypothetical society that 
was more or less likely to change their social attitudes. These scenarios and descriptions were 
designed specifically for this study and can be found in Figure 3. Next to each description is a 
figure displaying the amount of average social attitude change over the course of a decade 
compared to other societies. In the ever-changing society the average attitude change is well 
above the average society. In the rarely-changing society the average attitude change is well 
below the average society.  
 After reading about Country A, participants completed two items as manipulation checks 
on the perceived inequality and social change in Country A. These items read, "The society of 
Country A is unequal" and "The society of Country A is resistant to social change." The 
dependent variable is a five-item measure of the perceived legitimacy of the hypothetical society. 
Three items were adapted from Kay and Jost’s (2003) measure of system justification. The items  
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Figure 2  
 
Unequal (top panel) and equal (bottom panel) stimuli materials for Study 2a. 
 
 
Country A 
 
Country A is a self-governed 
society. The people of Country A 
come from a variety of racial and 
ethnic backgrounds. There are a 
broad variety of unskilled, 
technical, and professional jobs 
within Country A and the average 
family income is $68,200.  
  
A recent census of Country A has shown that the richest 20% of people living in Country A own 
84% of the wealth. The next richest 20% own 11% of the wealth and the rest of the society owns 
only 4.3% of the wealth. So, the richest 40% of the society owns 95% of the wealth and the 
poorest 60% of society own 4.3% of the wealth. Overall, Country A has a high degree of 
inequality and a growing economy.   
 
Country A 
 
Country A is a self-governed 
society. The people of Country A 
come from a variety of racial and 
ethnic backgrounds. There are a 
broad variety of unskilled, 
technical, and professional jobs 
within Country A and the average 
family income is $68,200.  
 
 
A recent census of Country A has shown that the richest 20% of people living in Country A own 
36% of the wealth. The next richest 20% own 21% of the wealth and the rest of the society owns 
43% of the wealth. So, the richest 40% of the society owns 57% of the wealth and the poorest 
60% of society own 43% of the wealth. Overall, Country A has a low degree of inequality and a 
growing economy. 
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Each Wealth Quintile 
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Figure 3 
Changing (top panel) and unchanging(bottom panel) stimuli for Study 2b. 
Country A 
 
Country A is a self-governed society. The people of Country A come from a variety of racial and ethnic 
backgrounds. The people of Country A are forward thinking and open to new experiences. Although the 
social order and government in Country A are relatively stable, the people in Country A often re-examine 
their political, social, and religious values. 
 
A recent analysis of survey 
responses from many societies 
throughout the world found that the 
people of Country A have ever 
changing social attitudes. Across 
the last six decades analysis of the 
survey data found that Country A 
averaged 49% change in social 
attitudes from the previous 
decade—significantly more attitude 
change than the typical society. 
Social scientists predict that this 
trend will continue for at least the 
next 30 years. 
 
Country A 
 
Country A is a self-governed society. The people of Country A come from a variety of racial and ethnic 
backgrounds. The people of Country A are cautious and conventional. The social order and government 
in Country A are relatively stable and the people in Country A seek to maintain their traditional political, 
social, and religious values. 
 
A recent analysis of survey 
responses from many societies 
throughout the world found that the 
people of Country A rarely change 
their social attitudes. Across the last 
six decades analysis of the survey 
data found that Country A averaged 
5% change in social attitudes from 
the previous decade—significantly 
less attitude change than the typical 
society. Social scientists predict 
that this trend will continue for at 
least the next 30 years. 
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can be found in Table 9 and were measured on a seven-point scale with the labels disagree 
strongly, disagree moderately, disagree slightly, neither agree nor disagree, agree slightly, agree 
moderately, and agree strongly. Two additional items assessing how much participants want to 
live in the society and their confidence in the leaders of the society were also included.  These 
seven items created highly reliable scales in both studies (Study 2a α = .95, Study 2b α = .88). 
Table 5 
Items measuring the legitimacy of Country A in Study 2 
 
In general, you find the society of Country A to be fair. 
 
In general, the Country A political system operates as it should. 
 
The society of Country A needs to be radically restructured.  
 
I would like to live in a society like Country A. 
 
I have confidence that the leaders in Country A will make the right decisions. 
 
 
Factor Analysis 
 Similar to the Study 1 pretest, factor analysis was used to further understand the measure 
of the resistance to social change. Principle axis factoring of the seven items revealed one factor 
that accounted for  53.68 percent of the variance. All items had loadings ranging from .57 to .83. 
A second principle axis factor analysis with oblimin rotation was run using items from both the 
resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality scales to demonstrate that the 
resistance to social change is a separable construct from the acceptance of inequality. This 
analysis revealed three factors accounting for 42.77, 11.45, and 9.53 percent of the variance. The 
factor loadings from the pattern matrix are presented in Table 10. Consistent with work on the 
dimensionality of the social dominance orientation scale (e.g., Jost & Thompson, 2000), the first 
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two factors represent the pro-trait and con-trait items of the measure of the acceptance of 
inequality (i.e., the social dominance orientation scale). The third factor contains all seven items 
of the resistance to social change (loadings range from  .54 to .86). Thus, the measure of the 
resistance to social change appears to represent one factor that is distinct from the acceptance of 
inequality. Correlational analyses revealed that, as would be expected in a relatively unequal 
country like the United States, the measure of the resistance to social change was moderately 
correlated with the acceptance of inequality (r[209]=.54, p<.001). These factor analyses further 
demonstrate that the resistance to social change is a coherent construct that is independent 
(though correlated) with the acceptance of inequality. 
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Table 6 
 
Principle axis factor analysis with oblimin rotation reveals a three factor solution for the 
acceptance of inequality and the resistance to social change items. 
 
 
Factor 1  
Acceptance of 
Inequality  
Con-Trait 
Factor 2 
Acceptance of 
Inequality Pro-
Trait 
Factor 3 
Resistance to 
Social Change 
Resistance to Social Change Items    
I would be reluctant to make any large-scale changes to the 
social order. 
.157 -.054 .625 
I generally consider social changes to be a negative thing.  .172 .015 .627 
If I were to be informed that there’s going to be significant 
societal changes, I would probably feel stressed.  
-.044 -.052 .827 
Societal changes seem like a real hassle to me. -.070 .021 .856 
Often, I feel a bit uncomfortable even about social changes that 
may potentially improve my life. 
-.096 .120 .787 
I tend to resist social change even if I think the change may 
ultimately benefit me. 
-.018 .119 .699 
Being virtuous and law-abiding is in the long run better for us 
than permanently challenging the foundation of our society.  
.078 -.010 .536 
Social Dominance Orientation Items    
Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups. .084 .730 .030 
In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force 
against other groups. 
.012 .628 .057 
It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others. .292 .504 -.049 
To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other 
groups. 
-.101 .811 -.049 
If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer 
problems. 
-.064 .829 .126 
It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and 
other groups are at the bottom. 
.359 .582 .051 
Inferior groups should stay in their place. .114 .810 .040 
Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place. -.017 .815 .086 
It would be good if groups could be equal. -.771 -.121 -.016 
Group equality should be our ideal. -.927 .080 -.022 
All groups should be given an equal chance in life. -.602 -.139 .063 
We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different 
groups. 
-.860 .037 -.033 
Increased social equality is beneficial to society. -.845 -.042 -.069 
We would have fewer problems if we treated people more 
equally. 
-.640 -.226 .035 
We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible. -.729 .202 -.157 
No group should dominate in society. -.686 -.128 -.072 
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CHAPTER VIII 
RESULTS (STUDIES 2a AND 2b) 
Study 2a 
Study 2a: Manipulation Checks 
 The manipulation was successful. Participates perceived the unequal society as more 
unequal (M = 5.71, SD = 1.65) than the equal society (M = 3.44, SD = 1.73), t(117) = -7.32, p < 
.001. Participants also perceived the unequal society (M = 5.03, SD = 1.34) as more resistant to 
change compared to the equal society (M = 3.60, SD = 1.41), t(117) = -5.69, p < .001. These 
results were confirmed with a 2 (society: Equal vs. Unequal) X 2 (manipulation check measure: 
unequal vs. resistant to social change) mixed ANOVA where the second factor was a within 
subject variable. There were significant effects of condition, F(1, 106) = 63.50, p < .001,   
  = 
.38, manipulation check, F(1, 106) = 5.32, p = .02,   
  = .05, and a condition X manipulation 
check interaction, F(1, 106) = 7.76, p = .01,   
  = .07. The significant interaction indicated that 
although the equal society was seen as approximately equal in terms of inequality and the 
resistance to social change (p = .74), the unequal society was seen as more unequal than it was 
resistant to social change (p < .001). 
Study 2a: Hypothesis Testing 
 Hypothesis 1 predicts that the acceptance of inequality will be positively associated with 
system legitimacy in the unequal society and unrelated (or potentially negatively related) in the 
more equal society. Hypothesis 2 predicts that the resistance to social change will be positively 
associated with system legitimacy no matter the inequality of the social system. To test these two 
hypotheses, a 2 (society: Equal vs. Unequal) X continuous (resistance to social change) X 
continuous (acceptance of inequality) general linear model was used to predict the perceived 
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legitimacy of the country. As predicted by hypothesis 2, the resistance to social change was 
positively associated with system legitimacy across both equal and unequal countries, b = .24, SE 
= .12, F(1, 111) = 4.28, p = .04,   
  = .04. There was also a significant main effect of the 
acceptance of inequality on system legitimacy, b = .26, SE = .13, F(1, 111) = 3.97, p = .05,   
  = 
.03, and a significant negative effect of condition (coded -1 = equal, 1 = unequal), b = -.78, SE = 
.13, F(1, 111) = 38.39, p < .001,   
  = .26, indicating that across participants, people tended to 
perceive the more equal society as more legitimate.  
 These main effects were qualified by a significant interaction between the experimental 
condition and the acceptance of inequality, F(1, 111) = 16.52, p < .001,   
  = .13 (see Figure 4). 
In the equal country there was a nonsignificant negative association between the acceptance of 
inequality and system legitimacy, b = -.27, SE = .21, F(1, 111) = 1.70, p =.20,   
  = .02. In the 
unequal country there was a significant positive association between the acceptance of inequality 
and system legitimacy, b = .78, SE = .16, F(1, 111) = 24.99, p <.001,   
  = .18. These results 
suggest that when the structure of society matches the goals of people who oppose equality they 
will be more likely to perceive the society as legitimate, but that when the society does not 
clearly match these goals there is no consistent association between the acceptance of inequality 
and system legitimacy. No other interactions were significant (all p's > .19).
3
 
  
                                                          
3
 Because the experimental condition affected the perceived resistance to social change of the society (the 
manipulation check), identical analyses were conducted controlling for the resistance to social change manipulation 
check item. The results are primarily identical to those reported here, although the main effect of the acceptance of 
inequality becomes marginal (p = .10). 
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Figure 4. The acceptance of inequality (AOI) only predicts system legitimacy in an unequal 
society. 
 
 
Study 2b 
Study 2b: Manipulation Checks 
 The manipulation was successful. Participants saw the changing society (M = 2.13, SD = 
1.41) as less resistant to change than the unchanging society (M = 5.51, SD = 1.50), t(101) = -
11.97, p < .001. The two societies were perceived as equally unequal (changing: M = 3.27, SD = 
1.59; unchanging: M = 3.54, SD = 1.60), t(100) = -.87, p = .39. These results were confirmed 
with a 2 (society: changing vs. unchanging) X 2 (manipulation check: unequal vs. resistant to 
social change) mixed ANOVA where the second factor was a within subject variable. There 
were significant effects of condition, F(1, 100) = 56.33, p < .001,   
  = .36, manipulation check, 
F(1, 100) = 5.04, p = .03,   
  = .05, and a condition X manipulation check interaction, F(1, 100) 
= 69.94, p < .001,   
  = .41. The significant interaction indicated that the changing society was 
seen as less resistant to change than it was unequal (p < .001) and the unchanging society was 
seen as more resistant to social change than it was unequal (p < .001).  
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Study 2b: Hypothesis Testing 
 Hypothesis 3 suggested that the resistance to social change would be positively related to 
system legitimacy in the unchanging society, but unrelated (or negatively related) in the 
changing society. To test this hypothesis, a 2 (society: Changing vs. Unchanging) X continuous 
(resistance to social change) X continuous (acceptance of inequality) general linear model was 
used to predict the perceived legitimacy of the country. There was a significant positive main 
effect of the resistance to social change, b = .24, SE = .10, F(1, 95) = 6.25, p = .01,   
  = .06. 
Consistent with hypothesis 3, this main effect was qualified by a significant interaction between 
the resistance to social change and the experimental condition, F(1, 95) = 4.97, p = .03,   
  = .05 
(see Figure 5). In changing societies, there was no association between the resistance to social 
change and legitimacy, b = .03, SE = .13, F(1, 95) = .04, p = .84,   
  = .0004; however, in 
unchanging societies there was a robust and positive association between the resistance to social 
change and legitimacy, b = .45, SE = .14, F(1, 95) = 11.05, p = .001,   
  = .10. In sum, when 
society is seen as stable, unchanging, and in line with the goals of people who resist social 
change, the resistance to social change positively predicts system legitimacy. However, when 
these goals are not met there is not a relationship between the resistance to social change and 
legitimacy. 
 There was also a significant interaction between the acceptance of inequality and the 
experimental condition, F(1, 95) = 6.08, p = .02,   
  = .06 (see Figure 6). In changing societies 
there was no significant association between the acceptance of inequality and system legitimacy, 
b = -.22, SE = .16, F(1, 95) = 1.80, p = .18,   
  = .02; however, in unchanging societies there was 
a significant and positive association between the acceptance of inequality and system 
legitimacy, b = .33, SE = .15, F(1, 95) = 4.78, p = .03,   
  = .05. All other main effects and 
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interactions were not significant (all p's > .30). 
Figure 5. The resistance to social change (RSC) only predicts system legitimacy in unchanging 
societies. 
  
Figure 6. The effect acceptance of inequality (AOI) on system legitimacy reverses in changing 
and unchanging societies. 
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CHAPTER IX 
DISCUSSION (STUDIES 2a AND 2b) 
 When a society matches the system-relevant motivations of an individual, the individual 
perceives the society as more legitimate. In Study 2a, participants who were more accepting and 
supportive of unequal group relationships perceived the unequal social system as more legitimate 
than people who opposed inequality and expressed more egalitarian attitudes. In more equal 
societies there was no association between the acceptance of inequality and system legitimacy. In 
fact, the association trended in the opposite direction, consistent with the cross-societal results of 
Study 1.  In Study 2b, participants who were more resistant to social change perceived the 
unchanging society as more legitimate than participants who were less resistant to social change. 
In the changing society condition, there was no association between the resistance to social 
change and legitimacy. These effects were found even though the resistance to social change and 
the acceptance of inequality were both entered into the same models predicting system 
legitimacy which indicates that these two system-relevant motivations, although correlated, 
affect system legitimacy independently.  
 The results from these two studies provide important evidence for the 2D-MOSL. First, 
in Study 2a, both system-relevant motivations predicted legitimacy in the unequal social context, 
but only the resistance to social change predicted legitimacy in the more equal context. Second, 
the results of Study 2b, provide evidence for the rationale underlying the predicted acceptance of 
inequality X societal status quo interaction. Specifically, the results of Study 2b suggest that 
people will see social systems that match their system-relevant goals as legitimate. One way to 
succinctly summarize the results from Studies 2a and 2b is "context matters." 
 There was one unexpected result in Study 2b. In the unchanging society condition there 
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was a positive association between the acceptance of inequality and system legitimacy. There are 
several possibilities for this unexpected result. One explanation could be that some people accept 
inequality because they believe that inequality and hierarchy create a stable and efficient social 
system--i.e., they have a lay theory of the "functional nature of hierarchy" (for social 
psychological accounts of this idea see e.g., Halevy, Chou, & Galinsky, 2012). The stability and 
efficiency of hierarchy may not be captured in the measure of the resistance to social change, 
which explains why the unexpected interaction appears even while controlling for the resistance 
to social change. It could also be that people are using stability as a heuristic for inequality, even 
though they do not express this idea explicitly (i.e., on the manipulation checks). Future work 
will be necessary to see if this anomalous pattern of results replicates and to tease apart potential 
explanations for the effect. 
 In sum, both Studies 2a and 2b provide further support for the 2D-MOSL. People 
legitimized social systems that matched their system-relevant goals. Importantly, in the unequal 
condition the results replicated past research from SJT and SDT, but in the more equal contexts 
the effects disappeared and nearly reversed, a pattern of results that was also observe in the first 
study. The resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality are both associated with 
legitimacy in more unequal countries, but the effect of the acceptance of inequality disappears in 
more equal countries.  By taking into account a more diverse set of societies with different 
societal characteristics it may be possible to derive a more complex, and more accurate, model of 
system legitimacy. 
  
 
  
 59 
CHAPTER X 
RATIONAL AND HYPOTHESES (STUDY 3) 
The first two studies provide support from the primary predictions of the 2D-MOSL; 
however, neither study is completely experimental. That is, in both studies unanticipated third 
variables may be able to account for the effects. Thus, the purpose of Study 3 is to test the 
distinct predictive power of the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality, as 
well as the expected interaction between the acceptance of inequality and the societal status quo 
with a fully experimental design.  
I attempted to manipulate the resistance to social change with a manipulation of system-
threat. Researchers use this manipulation (and similar others) to induce several different 
manifestations of the resistance to system change (Banfield et al., 2009; Jost et al., 2005; Kay et 
al., 2009; Kay, Jost, & Young, 2005; Lau, Kay, & Spencer, 2008) and right-wing 
authoritarianism (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Jugert & Duckitt, 2009).  
In addition, I attempted to manipulate the acceptance of inequality with a manipulation of 
a competitive worldview. Duckitt (2001; Duckitt et al., 2002; Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007a, 
2007b) and his colleagues have repeatedly demonstrated that the perception of the world as a 
competitive place is a key underlying component to the acceptance of inequality; however, this 
has never been manipulated. Past manipulations of social dominance orientation focus on 
manipulating the salience of competitive or threatening intergroup relationships (Hunag & Liu, 
2005; Morrison & Ybarra, 2008) or the social status of participants (Guimond, Dambrun, 
Michinov, & Duarte, 2003; Schmitt, Branscombe, & Kappen, 2003). While these studies are 
important because they demonstrate that the acceptance of inequality is potentially malleable, 
they primarily focus on specific intergroup relations rather than the features of the social system. 
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Thus, the manipulation of the acceptance of inequality via a manipulation of societal competition 
has the potential to be a methodological advancement. 
Finally, the inequality of the status quo was manipulated by varying the extent of racial 
inequality. Participants will be exposed to one of two sets of information about racial disparities 
in unemployment. To maintain believability, both sets of information will communicate racial 
disparities; however, one set of information will convey greater disparities than the other. 
Consistent with primary predictions of the 2D-MOSL, I expect that the resistance to social 
change will predict legitimacy no matter the inequality of the status quo, whereas the acceptance 
of inequality will predict legitimacy in the unequal context, but will be less predictive (or 
negatively) predictive in the more equal context. This pattern of results would replicate the 
primary predictions of the 2D-MOSL that were demonstrate in the first two studies.  
As an additional attempt to distinguish the two system relevant motivations I also 
included measures of racial intolerance. Recent research has found that people who are 
motivated to justify the system (i.e., resist social change) will adopt attitudes and beliefs that are 
consistent with the status quo (Kay et al., 2009). For example, when told that there are large 
gender disparities, participants reported more sexism because sexist attitudes help to justify the 
current social system. Other research over the last two decades has demonstrated that the 
acceptance of inequality is related to racism (see e.g., Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). In the 2D-MOSL 
I aim to put these two effects together by predicting that the association between the resistance to 
social change and racial intolerance will depend on the status quo (a replicate of Kay et al., 
1999), but that the acceptance of inequality will predict racial intolerance no matter the 
inequality of the status quo. If the two system motivations were identical then both motivations 
should be similarly affected by the societal context. For example, if the acceptance of inequality 
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was a system justifying motivation than its association with racial intolerance should change 
depending on the context. However, if it is distinct from the resistance to social change, it should 
not necessarily interact with the inequality of the societal context.  
Statement of Study 3 Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis I: There will be an interaction between the resistance to social change and the 
inequality of the status quo when predicting racial attitudes, such that people who are resistant to 
social change will have equivalent racial attitudes. People who are motivated to resist social 
change, however, will be affected by the inequality of the status quo, such that they will be more 
likely to be racially tolerant when the status quo has smaller racial disparities and less likely to 
be racially tolerant when the status quo has larger racial disparities. 
 Hypothesis II: There will be a main effect of the acceptance of inequality, such that the 
acceptance of inequality will lead people to be less racially tolerant. 
 Hypotheses III: There will be an interaction between the acceptance of inequality and the 
inequality of the status quo. Participants accepting of inequality will see the system as more 
legitimate when the status quo is unequal compared to participants who are not accepting of 
inequality. Participants accepting of inequality will see the system as either equivalent in 
legitimacy or less legitimate when the status quo is equal compared to participants who are not 
accepting of inequality.  
 Hypothesis IV: The relationship between the resistance to social change and the 
legitimacy of the system will not be affected by the inequality of the status quo. Instead, there 
will be a main effect of the resistance to social change such that the resistance to social change 
will lead people to see the social system as more legitimate. 
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CHAPTER XI 
METHOD (STUDY 3) 
Participants 
 Two hundred and twenty two participants (81 men, 170 women, M age = 20.2, SD = 2.7) 
were recruited from DePaul University’s introduction to psychology subject pool and received 
partial course credit for their participation.  
Procedure and Measures 
As a manipulation of societal and system threat, participants were randomly assigned to 
the high or low system threat condition based on the system threat manipulation originally 
developed by Kay, Jost, and Young (2005).
4
 Participants were asked to read an excerpt from a 
larger article ostensibly written by a foreign journalist. The high system threat condition contains 
quotes such as “the country has reached a low point.” The low system threat condition contains 
quotes such as “people in the United States feel safer and more secure relative to the past.” Past 
work with this manipulation demonstrates that it is distinct from state self-esteem (Heatheron & 
Polivy, 1991) and collective self-esteem (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). 
 The manipulation of competition is adapted from research testing the role of competition 
on the formation of stereotypes related to warmth and competence (Caprariello, Cuddy, & Fiske, 
2009). In this research, the researchers described an incoming social group in competitive or 
cooperative terms. In my manipulation of competition I used similar wording to describe the 
                                                          
4
 In addition to the changes to the manipulation to induce system competition, one other edit was made to the 
original manipulation. The original high system threat manipulation included the sentence, "It seems that many 
countries in the world are enjoying better social, economic, and political conditions than the U.S. More and more 
Americans express a willingness to leave the United States and emigrate to other nations." The original low system 
threat manipulation included the following sentence, " It seems that compared with many countries in teh world the 
social, economic, and political conditions in the U.S. are relatively good. Very few Americans express a willingness 
to leave the United States and emigrate to other nations" These sentences were removed because they appeared to 
manipulate between-system competition that could potentially obscure the manipulation of system competition that 
was designed for this study and intended to be orthogonal to system threat. 
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group relationships in the society at a more abstract level rather than focusing on specific social 
groups. The following sentence was integrated into the high and low system threat manipulations 
to manipulate high competition: “Because of these social, economic, and political [threats / 
successes], groups within the United States compete and take more power and resources from 
one another.” The following sentence was used to indicate cooperation: “Because of these social, 
economic, and political [threats / successes], groups within the United States work together and 
share power and resources with each other.” The complete wording of the manipulations, 
including the integration into the system threat manipulations can be found in Appendix B.  
Following the manipulation, participants completed measures of the resistance to social 
change and the acceptance of inequality to check if the manipulations independently manipulated 
each of the system level motivations. These measures are the same as those used in Study 2 and 
both had high reliabilities (resistance to social change α = .79; acceptance of inequality α = .92).  
Similar to the previous studies, these two measures were modestly and significantly correlated (r 
= .50, p < .001). 
Next, to manipulate the status quo, participants were asked to read one of two sets of 
information describing the state of racial disparities in unemployment ostensibly gathered from 
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. One set of information, the large disparity condition, 
depicted the racial disparity as more than double, that is, Black Americans had twice the 
unemployment rate as White Americans (see Figure 7). It should be noted that this racial 
disparity is close to the actual racial disparity in unemployment. In the smaller disparities 
condition, the disparity was depicted as a difference of one percentage point (see Figure 8). 
Participants were encouraged to take their time to fully understand the material. Following this 
information, participants completed three  manipulation check items by indicating their  
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Figure 7 
Materials for the racial inequality is the status quo condition. 
Unemployment Rate for Black and White Americans
1
 
 
In the first six months of 2011 the unemployment rate for White 
Americans ranged from 6.9% to 7.1%, two percentage points below the 
national average. During the same period, the unemployment rate for 
Black Americans ranged from 15.2% to 16.3%, more than twice the 
unemployment rate of White Americans and a full six percentage points 
above the national average. 
1
 Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics  
 
agreement with the following three statements: “Based on the information, according to the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics the unemployment rate for Black Americans is significantly higher 
than the unemployment rate for White Americans," "In the United States, Black Americans and 
White Americans are equally likely to be employed,"  and "Blacks and Whites have equal 
opportunities to obtain employment." Participants responded on a seven point scale with the 
labels disagree strongly, disagree moderately, disagree slightly, neither agree nor disagree, agree 
slightly, agree moderately, agree strongly. Responses were coded so that higher levels of  
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
14 
16 
Jan. 2011 Feb. 2011 Mar. 2011 Apr. 2011 May. 2011 Jun. 2011 
U
n
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
R
at
e
 
Black Americans White Americans 
 65 
Figure 8  
Materials for the racial equality is the status quo condition. 
Unemployment Rate for Black and White Americans
1
 
 
In the first six months of 2011 the unemployment rate for White 
Americans ranged from 7.9% to 8.1%, just a percentage point below the 
national average. During the same period, the unemployment rate for 
Black Americans ranged from 8.8% to 9.2%, just one percentage point 
higher than White Americans and consistent with the national average. 
1
 Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics  
 
agreement indicated the perception of more racial equality and then averaged together to form a 
scale. The first  item of the scale significantly decreased the scales reliability and so it was 
analyzed separately. The last two items were used to form a scale (r = .55, p < .001). 
 Several items were used as dependent measures. The first two items that measured racial 
employment tolerance read “In general, Blacks and Whites should have equal opportunities to 
obtain employment” and “In general, Blacks and Whites should be given equal consideration 
when applying for an employment position.”  These items were assessed on a seven-point scale 
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with the labels disagree strongly, disagree moderately, disagree slightly, neither agree nor 
disagree, agree slightly, agree moderately, agree strongly. The items were coded so that higher 
scores indicated greater racial employment tolerance and were averaged together to form a scale 
(r = .72, p < .001). The next eight items were from the Symbolic Racism 2000 scale (Henry & 
Sears, 2002); a construct that measures attitudes towards Black Americans organized around four 
specific themes:  
“(1) ‘work ethic and responsibility for outcomes,’ the sense that blacks' failure to 
progress results from their unwillingness to work hard enough; (2) ‘excessive 
demands,’ the sense that blacks are demanding too much; (3) ‘denial of 
continuing racial discrimination,’ the belief that blacks no longer face much 
prejudice in society today; and (4) ‘undeserved advantage,’ the sense that blacks 
have gotten more than they deserve” (Henry & Sears, 2002, p. 256). 
The eight items from this scale can be found in Table 11.  One item from the symbolic racism 
scale, ("Some say that black leaders have been trying to push too fast.  Others feel that they 
haven’t pushed fast enough.  What do you think?") was weakly and negatively correlated with 
the rest of the items from this scale and so it was not included with the rest of the scale. The 
remaining items were coded so that higher scores indicated higher levels of symbolic racism. 
These items were standardized and averaged together to form a reliable scale (α = .84). The 
measure of racial employment tolerance and symbolic racism were weakly correlated (r [235] = -
.28, p < .001). 
 To measure system legitimacy, several items from Jost's economic system justification 
scale and general system justification scale were used (Kay & Jost, 2003; Jost et al., 2010; Jost & 
Thompson, 2000). The economic system justification scale is designed to measure the perceived  
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Table 7 
Items from the Symbolic Racism scale (Henry & Sears, 2002) 
 
It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they 
could be just as well off as whites. (1 disagree strongly to 7 agree strongly) 
 
Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up.  
Blacks should do the same. (1 disagree strongly to 7 agree strongly) 
 
Some say that black leaders have been trying to push too fast.  Others feel that they haven’t 
pushed fast enough.  What do you think? (1 trying to push very much too fast, 2 going too 
slowly, 3 moving at about the right speed) 
 
How much of the racial tension that exists in the United States today do you think blacks are 
responsible for creating? (1 all of it to 4 not much at all) 
 
How much discrimination against blacks do you feel there is in the United States today, limiting 
their chances to get ahead? (1 a lot to 4 none at all) 
 
Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for 
blacks to work their way out of the lower class. (1 disagree strongly to 7 agree strongly) 
 
Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve. (1 disagree strongly to 7 
agree strongly) 
 
Over the past few years, blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve. (1 disagree 
strongly to 7 agree strongly) 
 
 
legitimacy of the American economic system. I did not include items that specifically referenced 
capitalism or other economic systems broadly (e.g., "No matter how much people try to stop it, 
there will always be widespread business corruption under Capitalism." reverse scored), 
choosing instead to just focus on the items assessing the legitimacy of the United States 
economic system. Similarly, I did not include items that provided reasons and justifications for 
the inequality in the American economic system (e.g., "If incomes were more equal, nothing 
would motivate people to work hard.) choosing instead to focus exclusively on legitimacy (and 
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not justifications). A total of eight items were retained. An example item from the final set of 
items is,  "The way the free market system operates in the United States is fair" (see items in 
Table 12). After reverse scoring the appropriate items, the items were averaged together to form 
a reliable scale (α = .83). An additional eight items from the general system justification scale 
were used. These items measure the perceive legitimacy of the American "system" more broadly, 
focusing on the social, economic, and political arenas. The items are in Table 13. After reverse 
scoring the appropriate items they were averaged together to form a reliable scale (α = .82). All 
items in both scales were measured on seven point scales ranging from 1 disagree strongly to 7 
agree strongly. 
Table 8 
Items from the Economic System Justification scale (Jost & Thompson, 2000) 
 
The way the free market system operates in the United States is fair. 
 
The American economic system is set up so that everyone is born with the same chance to 
succeed. 
 
The rules of our economic system only encourage greed and immorality. 
 
Radical changes are needed to turn our economic system into a fair one. 
 
There is no country in the world where economic opportunities are better than in the United 
States. 
 
The American economic system unfairly increases the gap between rich and poor. 
 
We should be embarrassed by the high rates of poverty in America. 
 
Only a grand-scale economic revolution could create a better, more just distribution of resources 
in society. 
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Table 9 
Items from the General System Justification scale (Kay & Jost, 2003) 
 
In general, you find society to be fair. 
 
In general, the American political system operates as it should. 
 
American society needs to be radically restructured. 
 
The United States is the best country in the world to live in. 
 
Most policies serve the greater good. 
 
Everyone has a fair shot at wealth and happiness. 
 
Our society is getting worse every year. 
 
Society is set up so that people usually get what they deserve. 
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CHAPTER XII 
RESULTS (STUDY 3) 
Manipulation Checks 
 A 2 (Competition vs. Cooperation) X 2 (High vs. Low System Threat) general linear 
model was used to predict both the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality 
measures. Across these analyses there were no significant main effects or interactions on either 
of the measures (all F's < 1.73, all p's > .18, all   
 's < .008, see Figure 9), indicating that the 
manipulation of system threat and system competition did not affect the resistance to social 
change and the acceptance to inequality as anticipated. Thus, for the rest of the analyses in this 
study I will collapse across the experimental conditions and use the measured resistance to social 
change and the acceptance of inequality scales as my primary independent variables. 
  For both the single item inequality manipulation check measure (Unequal: M = 6.36, SD 
= 1.22, Equal: M = 3.82, SD = 2.05, t(248) = 11.79, p < .001, d = 1.50) and the two item 
manipulation check scale (Unequal: M = 5.30, SD = 1.45, Equal: M = 4.82, SD = 1.44, t(248) = 
2.62, p = .009, d = .32) participants perceived more racial disparities in the unequal compared to 
the more equal conditions. It is interesting to note that even in the Equal condition the responses 
were near the midpoint of the scale indicating that regardless of condition participants perceived 
some level of inequality. 
Testing Hypothesis I and II 
 Hypothesis I predicts that the resistance to social change will be moderated by the 
inequality of the status quo when predicting racial attitudes because expressing racial intolerance 
can serve to bolster and provide justifications for a racially unequal status quo, whereas 
expressing racial tolerance can serve to bolster and provide justifications for a more racially  
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Figure 9. 
The effects of the manipulations of competition and system threat on the resistance to social 
change (top panel) and the acceptance of inequality (bottom panel). 
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inequality because people who accept inequality and have social dominance motives are more 
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continuous (acceptance of inequality) X 2 (unequal vs. equal status quo) general linear model 
predicting the measure of racial tolerance and the symbolic racism scale. I expected that the 
results would be analogous across measures.  
 When predicting racial employment tolerance there was only one significant effect. The 
acceptance of inequality negatively predicted racial employment tolerance (b = -.42, SE = .07, 
F[1, 220] = 36.40, p < .001,   
  = .14), consistent with the second hypothesis. There were no 
other significant main effects or interactions (all F's < 1.19, all p's > .27, all   
 's < .005). When 
predicting symbolic racism there was a significant main effect for the resistance to social change 
(b = .12, SE = .05, F[1, 211] = 5.68, p = .02,   
  = .03), such that people who resisted social 
change were more likely to score high on the symbolic racism measure. There was also a main 
effect of the acceptance of inequality (b = .31, SE = .05, F[1, 211] = 48.19, p < .001,   
  = .19), 
such that people who accepted inequality were more likely to be symbolic racists. Again, this 
latter effect is consistent with the second hypothesis There were no other main effects or 
interactions (all F's < 1.13, all p's > .28, all   
 's < .005). These results provide consistent support 
for Hypothesis II, but no support for Hypothesis I.  
Testing Hypothesis III and IV 
 Hypothesis III predicts an interaction between the acceptance of inequality and the 
manipulation of inequality when predicting legitimacy, such that the acceptance of inequality 
will be positively associated with legitimacy in unequal contexts, but negatively or unrelated 
with legitimacy is more equal contexts. This hypothesis is conceptually similar to the findings 
for the acceptance of inequality in Studies 1 and 2a. Hypothesis IV predicts a main effect for the 
resistance to social change on the legitimacy of the social system no matter the inequality of the 
particular context. 
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 To test Hypotheses III and IV I used a continuous (resistance to social change) X 
continuous (acceptance of inequality) X 2 (unequal vs. equal status quo) general linear model 
predicting the two measures of legitimacy. When predicting economic legitimacy there were 
significant main effects of the resistance to social change (b = .37, SE = .08, F[1, 218] = 23.84, p 
< .001,  
  = .10) and the acceptance of inequality (b = .22, SE = .07, F[1, 218] = 9.41, p = .002, 
  
  = .04). People who were more resistant to change and who were more accepting of inequality 
were more likely to see the economic system as legitimate. There were, however, no other 
significant main effects or interactions (all F's < 1.90, all p's > .17, all   
 's < .009). Nearly 
identical results were obtained when predicting the measure of generalized legitimization of the 
social system. There were significant main effects of the resistance to social change (b = .39, SE 
= .08, F[1, 216] = 26.58, p < .001,   
  = .11) and the acceptance of inequality (b = .21, SE = .07, 
F[1, 216] = 9.28, p = .003,   
  = .04). People who were more resistant to change and who were 
more accepting of inequality were more likely to see the economic system as legitimate. There 
were, however, no other significant main effects or interactions (all F's < .29, all p's > .59, all 
  
 's < .001). These results provide support consistent with Hypothesis IV, but not with 
Hypothesis III. 
 Previously, I noted that even in the unequal experimental condition people perceived 
some level of inequality (the manipulation checks were near the midpoint of the scale). If people 
in both conditions primarily perceived society as unequal than the legitimacy results are 
consistent with the primary prediction of the 2D-MOSL: The acceptance of inequality and the 
resistance to social change will simultaneously and independently predict legitimacy in unequal 
social systems. Depending on how one interprets the manipulation checks, the result of the 
previous paragraph provide support for this primary prediction of the 2D-MOSL across two 
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different measures of legitimacy. 
Additional Analyses 
 Across the analyses of the data from Study 3 thus far there has been clear support for 
both Hypothesis II and IV. There has not, however, been any support for the first and third 
hypothesis. It appears that despite the demonstration that the status quo manipulation had an 
effect on the participants' perceptions of racial inequality it did not result in changes in 
participants' racial attitudes and perceptions of legitimacy. To further explore this set of data I 
conducted several additional analyses. First, I replicate the above analyses using just White 
participants. Although it would be ideal to test my hypotheses with people of other ethnic 
backgrounds as well, no other ethnic category was well represented in the sample. The largest 
was Latino/a and only 34 participants (or 13.5% of the sample) fell into this grouping. Only 12 
participants identified themselves as African American/Black. Analyses only using White 
participants resulted in the exact same pattern of main effects and (non-significant) interactions 
for all of the dependent variables as did the analyses using the entire sample. 
 I also attempted the same basic analyses, but instead of using the manipulation of racial 
inequality, I used the one-item manipulation check of racial inequality and then repeated the 
analyses using the two item manipulation check scale. Using the one item manipulation check, 
the analyses revealed the same exact pattern of main effects and (non-significant) interactions. 
The two-item manipulation check scale did reveal several different patterns of results for the 
measure of symbolic racism and the legitimacy of the economic system (the results for racial 
employment tolerance and general legitimacy of the social system were identical to the results 
already presented). In the analyses that follow all interactions are probed at ±1SD of the mean for 
the measure of interest. "Perceptions of inequality" refer to the two-item manipulation check 
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scale. 
 When predicting symbolic racism there was a significant main effect of the acceptance of 
inequality (F[1, 211] = 41.72, p < .001,   
  = .17) which is consistent with the second hypothesis. 
There was also a significant main effect of perceptions of inequality (F[1, 211] = 14.35, p < .001, 
  
  = .06). There was a significant two-way interaction between the resistance to social change 
and perceptions of inequality (F[1, 211] = 6.35, p = .01,   
  = .03), and marginal two-way 
interactions between the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality (F[1, 211] = 
2.76, p = .10,   
  = .01) and the acceptance of inequality and perceptions of inequality (F[1, 211] 
= 3.25, p = .07,   
  = .02). Importantly, all of these significant and marginal effects were 
qualified by a significant three-way interaction between all the predictor variables (F[1, 211] = 
4.33, p = .04,   
  = .02; see Figure 10).  
 Because the first hypothesis predicts a two-way interaction between the resistance to 
social change and the experimental condition, I first probed and graphed the three-way 
interaction at high and low levels of the acceptance of inequality to see if the predicted two-way 
interaction emerged for people with different levels of the acceptance of inequality. When 
probing the three-way interaction between the resistance to social change, the acceptance of 
inequality, and perceptions of inequality when predicting symbolic racism the significant two-
way interaction between the resistance to social change and perceptions of inequality was non-
significant for people low on the acceptance of inequality (F[1, 211] = .49, p = .48,   
  = .002; 
see top panel of Figure 9). Among people who were low on the acceptance of inequality, there 
was a main effect of the resistance to social change (b = .12, SE = .06, F[1, 211] = 4.67, p = .03, 
  
  = .02) and perceptions of inequality (b = -.16, SE = .04, F[1, 211] = 18.40, p < .001,   
  =   
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Figure 10. 
Three-way interaction between the resistance to social change, the acceptance of inequality, and 
perceive inequality when predicting symbolic racism. 
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.08). These results are partially consistent with predictions, such that people who resisted social 
change where more likely to score high on the measure of symbolic racism; however, I predicted 
that the resistance to social change would be moderated by the inequality of the status quo and 
this effect did not emerge for people low on the acceptance of inequality.  
 The two-way interaction between the resistance to social change and the perceptions of 
inequality was significant for people high on the acceptance of inequality (F[1, 211] = 8.30, p = 
.004,   
  = .04; see bottom panel of Figure 10). For people who were high on the perceived 
inequality scale, the resistance to social change was marginally negatively associated with 
symbolic racism (b = -.19, SE = .11, F[1, 211] = 2.98, p = .09,   
  = .01), but for people who 
were low on the perceived inequality scale (people who perceived equality) there was a 
significant positive association between the resistance to social change and symbolic racism (b = 
.17, SE = .09, F[1, 211] = 5.43, p = .02,   
  = .03). This latter result is inconsistent with 
predictions and the work by Kay and colleagues (Kay et al., 2009). The interaction I predicted 
indicated that the resistance to social change would be positively associated with symbolic 
racism when there was perceived inequality, whereas the data suggests that there is a positive 
association when there was perceived equality. 
 When predicting the legitimacy of the economic system. there were theoretically 
consistent main effects of the resistance to social change (F[1, 218] = 16.63, p < .001,   
  = .07) 
and the acceptance of inequality (F[1, 218] = 4.60, p = .03,   
  = .02). There was also a marginal 
main effect of the perception of inequality (F[1, 218] = 3.60, p = .06,   
  = .02).  These main 
effects were qualified by a significant three-way interaction between the resistance to social 
change, the acceptance of inequality, and perceptions of inequality (F[1, 218] = 8.10, p = .005, 
  
  = .04; see Figure 11).   
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Figure 11. 
Three-way interaction between the resistance to social change, the acceptance of inequality, and 
perceive inequality when predicting economic legitimacy. 
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 Because the fourth hypothesis predicted an interaction between the acceptance of 
inequality and the inequality of the status quo, I first probed and graphed this three-way 
interaction for people high and low on the resistance to social change (note that this strategy for 
probing the interaction is different than the symbolic racism analysis because the two relevant 
hypotheses focus on two different potential interactions). Inconsistent with hypotheses, for 
participants who were high on the resistance to social change there was no significant interaction 
between the acceptance of inequality and perceptions of inequality (F[1, 218] = .46, p = .50,   
  = 
.002; see bottom panel Figure 11). There was, however, a significant main effect of the 
acceptance of inequality (b = .17, SE = .08, F[1, 211] = 4.33, p = .04,   
  = .02) and perceptions 
of inequality (b = -.14, SE = .06, F[1, 211] = 5.97, p = .02,   
  = .03), such that people who 
accept inequality and people who perceived more equality were more likely to see the economic 
system as legitimate. For participants that were low on the resistance to change there was a 
theoretically consistent significant two-way interaction between the acceptance of inequality and 
perceptions of inequality (F[1, 218] = 6.28, p = .01,   
  = .03; see top panel Figure 11). 
Consistent with the results from Study 2a, for participants who perceived there to be higher 
degrees of equality, there was no relationship between the acceptance of inequality and economic 
legitimacy (b = -.12, SE = .14, F[1, 218] = .69, p = .41,   
  = .003); however, for participants who 
perceived there to be higher degrees of inequality, there was a significant positive relationship 
between the acceptance of inequality and economic legitimacy(b = .36, SE = .13, F[1, 218] = 
7.87, p = .005,   
  = .04). 
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CHAPTER XIII 
DISCUSSION (STUDY 3) 
 Study 3 attempted to experimentally manipulate the resistance to social change and the 
acceptance of inequality simultaneously so that the causal effects of these two system relevant 
motivations on legitimacy could be established. Although results were mixed, there was some 
support for the 2D-MOSL. First, on both the measure of racial employment tolerance and 
symbolic racism, the acceptance of inequality was associated with lower levels of racial 
employment tolerance and higher levels of symbolic racism no matter the inequality of the status 
quo. This indicates that people who are motivated to have unequal social systems will be more 
intolerant towards a low status social group no matter the state of inequality. These results 
emerged even while controlling for the resistance to social change indicating that the two 
constructs are no necessarily redundant. However, these main effects, by itself, is easily 
incorporated into SDT. Second, the resistance to social change was associated with perceptions 
of legitimacy no matter the inequality of the status quo, indicating that people who are resistant 
to societal changes will legitimize unequal and equal social systems to gain the desired social 
stability. These results are consistent with the predictions of the 2D-MOSL and emerged while 
controlling for the acceptance of inequality. 
 I also predicted two two-way interactions. The first was between the resistance to social 
change and the inequality of the status quo when predicting the two measures of racial 
intolerance. These effects were not observed. Instead there was a main effect of the resistance to 
social change on the measure of symbolic racism, indicating that people who are resistant to 
societal changes are more likely to be symbolic racists. Although inconsistent with the predicted 
interaction, this main effect is consistent with the notion (mentioned briefly in the introduction) 
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that legitimizing ideologies, including racial legitimizing ideologies like symbolic racism (see 
Brandt & Reyna, 2012), can be driven by both system-relevant motivations. By endorsing 
symbolic racist ideologies people may be able to maintain the current racial status quo, 
especially since there was some racial inequality in both equality/inequality conditions, and thus 
help maintain the stability of the social system.  
 The second predicted two-way interaction was between  the acceptance of inequality and 
the inequality of the status quo. This interaction directly tested one of the primary predictions of 
the 2D-MOSL. Specifically, the prediction that the association between the acceptance of 
inequality and legitimacy depends on the inequality of the status quo. The predicted interaction 
did not obtain significance; however, the acceptance of inequality was positively associated with 
both measures of legitimacy. The failure of the inequality of the status quo manipulation to be a 
moderator in this study may indicate that participants already have a well formulated and 
crystallized view of racial inequality in the United States and a discrete manipulation of this 
inequality was  not enough to change people's crystallized beliefs. Consistent with this basic 
idea, participants in both conditions rate the inequality of the status quo near or above the 
midpoint of the scale. Moreover, a large literature indicates that crystallized attitudes are nearly 
impossible to change (e.g., Sears & Funk, 1991). If this is the case, then the main effect of the 
acceptance of inequality on the measures of legitimacy is in line with the predictions of the 2D-
MOSL. Specifically, given that the United States is characterized by racial disparities in a 
number of areas of public life (e.g., Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; Schlesinger, 2005), I would 
expect that people who accept inequality and resist social change would be more likely to 
legitimize the social system than their egalitarian and accepting of social change counterparts--an 
expectation confirmed in the current study. That is, both system-relevant motivations predicted 
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legitimacy independent and simultaneously indicating that they are independent predictors of 
legitimacy and not proxies for the same underlying dimension. 
 Because the manipulation of the racial status quo only appeared to manipulate the relative 
differences in perceived inequality and not absolute levels in perceive inequality, it raises the 
question as to why the manipulation worked in Study 2a? The manipulation in Study 2a was not 
in reference to an individual's own society and the inequality of the system was a key (if not 
defining) feature of the information given to participants to form their impressions. It may be 
more effective to manipulate perceptions of inequality prior to the formation of perceptions of 
societal inequality. Determining the best and most effective way to manipulate perceptions of 
inequality will be an important next step in this program of research. The differences between the 
current study and the first two studies (which obtained consistent support) may also be the 
samples used. The first two studies used representative samples of adults (Study 1) or an adult 
community sample (Study 2), whereas the current study used a student sample. Student samples 
may not have the live experiences necessary for the current study to be meaningful to them. 
 Beyond the planned analyses for Study 3, I also conducted several additional analyses to 
further understand the data. When predicting symbolic racism, the results were not consistent 
with my theoretical position. That is, the resistance to social change did not predict higher levels 
of symbolic racism when people perceived higher levels of inequality. In fact, the resistance to 
social change was associated with greater symbolic racism when people perceived racial equality 
and when they were high on the acceptance of inequality (perceived racial equality did not 
moderate the resistance to social change to symbolic racism relationship for people low on the 
acceptance of inequality). One potential reason for this unexpected effect is the content of 
symbolic racist attitudes. Features of symbolic racism include the perception that African 
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Americans do not suffer from discrimination and violate traditional American values. It might be 
that the confluence of beliefs about racial equality and the resistance to social change may 
combine in a similar way as the denial of discrimination and the perceived violation of values to 
produce a form of symbolic racism. This might especially be the case for people high on the 
acceptance of inequality because symbolic racism can serve as an ideology that legitimizes 
preferences for inequality (see Brandt & Reyna, 2012; Sidanius et al., 1992).  
 When predicting economic legitimacy, the results for people low on the resistance to 
social change did conform to expectations. For people who perceived inequality, the acceptance 
of inequality was positively associated with legitimacy, indicating that people legitimized the 
social system when it matched their goals. For people high on the resistance to social change, the 
acceptance of inequality was positively associated with legitimacy no matter the perceived 
inequality of the status quo.  
 In sum, Study 3 found consistent support for the primary prediction of the 2D-MOSL that 
both the acceptance of inequality and the resistance to social change predict legitimacy in an 
unequal country (the United States), but only if one is willing to ignore the ineffectual status quo 
manipulation. Similarly, the study found support for the idea that both the resistance to social 
change and the acceptance of inequality predict racial ideologies; however, as discussed above 
the role of perceptions of inequality in these relationships are unclear and inconclusive. 
Moreover, the predicted interaction that would have further distinguished the two system-
relevant motivations was not significant. Thus, although there was support for one of the primary 
predictions of the model, the secondary predictions were not born out. 
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CHAPTER XIV 
RATIONALE AND HYPOTHESES (STUDY 4) 
Up to this point I have demonstrated that the resistance to social change and the 
acceptance of inequality both simultaneously predict legitimacy in unequal social systems and 
that the association between the acceptance of inequality and legitimacy is dependent on the 
inequality of the status quo. These findings indicate that the two system-relevant motivations are 
independent motivations because their effects are independent of one another and they are 
affected by different societal conditions. Importantly, these effects suggest that SJT and SDT do 
not effectively capture of the nuance of legitimacy because they imply a single underlying 
system-relevant motivations. Thus far, the predictions relating the two system-relevant 
motivations to system legitimacy have followed previous research and ideas with a relatively 
straightforward strategy of integrating the research traditions of SDT and SJT and demonstrating 
how different contexts affect different motivations. However, by considering two system-
relevant motivations it is also possible to postulate motivational circumstances not anticipated by 
SDT and SJT. That is, the 2D-MOSL predicts phenomenon that cannot be anticipated by 
previous theories that postulate unitary system-relevant motivations.  
Conflicting System Motivations 
One area rich with possibility is the potential for conflicting system-relevant motivations. 
In a system with inequality, the resistance to social change tacitly supports inequality, which may 
explain why motivations to resist social change and accept inequality are moderately correlated 
(e.g., Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibely, 2009; Stangor & Leary, 2006). For example, a meta-
analysis of the correlation between right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation 
found that the highest recorded correlation between the two constructs was .66 in a sample of 
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Germans and the lowest recorded correlation between the two constructs was -.03 in a sample 
from Belgium (Roccato & Ricolfi, 2005). The average correlation was only .33 indicating that it 
is possible—if not common—for people to score high on one construct but low on another.  
Any potential conflict in system-relevant motivations is likely to occur for individuals 
who tend to resist change and have a mismatch between their level of the acceptance of 
inequality and the inequality within their particular system. In unequal countries, people who are 
low on the acceptance of inequality and high on the resistance to social change may feel conflict 
between the two motivations because they disagree with the hierarchical structure of the society 
and also resist the social change necessary to bring the structure of society in line with their 
preferences. For people who fall into this category of low acceptance of inequality and high 
resistance to social change, perceiving the system as legitimate represents a conflict of 
motivations. In more egalitarian social systems the same sort of motivational conflict is predicted 
to occur, but for those who accept inequality and resist social change.   
Research and theory in social psychology has long considered conflicting and 
inconsistent mental states (Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Festinger, 1957; Harmon-Jones, 2000). One 
manifestation of mental conflict is a sense of ambivalence about an attitude object, where “A 
person who feels mixed emotions and is torn about an attitude object feels ambivalent about it” 
(Newby-Clark, McGregor, & Zanna, 2002, p. 157) and has a mixture of positive and negative 
feelings toward the attitude object (Kaplan, 1972; Priester & Petty, 1996; Thompson & Zanna, 
1995). Jost and Burgess (2000) demonstrated that when motivations to feel good about one’s 
group and to justify the system conflict (as is the case with low status social groups) people 
express ambivalent attitudes about their group. Similarly, if the two system motivations conflict I 
expect people will experience ambivalence in their perceptions of the legitimacy of the system.  
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There is some research consistent with this hypothesis. Craig, Martinez, Kane, and 
Gainous (2005) found that people who scored high on a measure of egalitarianism and high on a 
measure of traditionalism experienced ambivalence in their attitudes towards gay rights public 
policy. To the extent that opposition to gays rights policy represents a legitimization of the 
current gender system; this study is perfectly in line with my perspective. My perspective is also 
consistent to some degree with Tetlock’s (1984) work on ideology and cognitive style. 
Specifically, Tetlock found that politicians who hold conflicting values make use of a more 
complex cognitive style that considers multiple perspectives on an issue, which may be a 
strategy to deal with conflicting values. 
There are several goals of Study 4. The first goal of this study is to test the system 
ambivalence predictions in an experimental context by manipulating the perceived inequality of 
the system and measuring the two system-relevant motivations. Ambivalence will be measured 
both objectively and subjectively. Objective measures of ambivalence take into account the 
number and strength of conflicting impressions, whereas subjective measures of ambivalence ask 
participants about the extent of their mixed emotions and tension regarding the issue (Newby-
Clark, McGregor, & Zanna, 2002; Priester & Petty, 1996). The second goal is to test the 
hypotheses of the previous three studies. By recoding objective measures of ambivalence it is 
possible to create a measure of legitimacy, and so this study also has the potential to replicate the 
primary predictions of the 2D-MOSL. That is, this study will test whether the resistance to social 
change and the acceptance of inequality both predict legitimacy in unequal social system, but 
that the acceptance of inequality does not predict legitimacy in more equal social systems.  
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Statement of Study 4 Hypothesis 
 Hypothesis I. There will be a three-way interaction between the two system-relevant 
motivations and the inequality of the status quo, such that when people believe the system is very 
unequal people who are low on the acceptance of inequality and high on the resistance to social 
change will feel the most ambivalence about the system. People who believe the system is more 
equal, are high on the acceptance of inequality, and high on the resistance to social change will 
feel the most ambivalence about the system. This is not to say that no other group of people will 
feel ambivalence towards the system, but rather the highest levels of ambivalence will be found 
in these groups. 
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CHAPTER XII 
METHOD (STUDY 4) 
Participants 
 One hundred and seventy-three participants (34 men, 126 women, M age = 20.1, SD = 
2.8) were recruited from DePaul University’s introduction to psychology subject pool and 
received partial course credit for their participation.  
Procedure and Measures 
The measures of the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality from the 
previous studies were used again in this study. Both measures formed reliable scales (resistance 
to social change α = .82; acceptance of inequality α = .93)  and were only weakly correlated 
(r[168] = .28, p < .001). After completing these measures participants were randomly assigned to 
one of two descriptions of group disparities in unemployment in the United States. In the first 
condition participants are asked to read and understand several figures and a short paragraph 
indicating that ethnic, age, and educational groups in the United States face large disparities in 
employment (see Figure 12). In the second condition participants are given the same task, but the 
disparities described are significantly smaller (see Figure 13). These materials are designed to 
manipulate the inequality of the status quo.  
Following this manipulation participants completed the following nine items as 
manipulation checks: "Based on the information, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics the 
unemployment rate for Black Americans is significantly higher than the unemployment rate for 
White Americans;" "In the United States, Black Americans and White Americans are equally 
likely to be employed;" "Blacks and Whites have equal opportunities to obtain employment;" 
"Based on the information, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics the unemployment rate  
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Figure 12 
Study 4: Unequal status quo experimental condition. 
Unemployment Rates for Groups in America
1
 
Unemployment Rate by Race 
 
Unemployment Rate by Educational 
Achievement 
Unemployment Rate by Age 
  
The unemployment rate for the first six months of 2011 was 9.1%. There were 
large disparities in the unemployment rate for racial, educational, and age groups 
in the United States. Black Americans, young people, and high school graduates all 
had a significantly more difficult time finding employment than did White 
Americans, older people, and college graduates. 
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Figure 13 
Study 4: More equal status quo condition. 
Unemployment Rates for Groups in America
1
 
Unemployment Rate by Race 
 
Unemployment Rate by Educational 
Achievement 
Unemployment Rate by Age 
  
The unemployment rate for the first six months of 2011 was 9.1%. There were 
only small disparities in the unemployment rate for racial, educational, and age 
groups in the United States. Black Americans, young people, and high school 
graduates all had a slightly more difficult time finding employment than did White 
Americans, older people, and college graduates. 
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for high school graduates is significantly higher than the unemployment rate for college 
graduates;" "In the United States, high school graduates and college graduates are equally likely 
to be employed;" "High school graduates and college graduates have equal opportunities to 
obtain employment;" "Based on the information, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics the 
unemployment rate for young adults (those 18-25) is significantly higher than the unemployment 
rate for other adults (those 25-65); " "In the United States, young adults (those 18-25) and other 
adults (those 25-65) are equally likely to be employed;" and "Young adults (those 18-25) and 
other adults (those 25-65) have equal opportunities to obtain employment." All nine items were 
measured on a seven point scale ranging from 1 disagree strongly to 7 agree strongly. After 
reverse-scoring the appropriate items, the nine items were averaged together to form a highly 
reliable scale (α = .82).  
 Two measures of system ambivalence were used as the dependent variables. The first is a 
measure of objective system ambivalence modeled on the measures of ambivalence used by 
attitude (e.g., Kaplan, 1972; Newby-Clark, McGregor, & Zanna, 2002; Priester & Petty, 1996) 
and system justification researchers (Jost & Burgess, 2000). Objective system ambivalence is 
conceptualized as the combination of system assessments related to either system legitimacy or 
illegitimacy. Participants were asked about four pairs of traits as they relate to the Supreme 
Court, the federal government, the participants’ local state government, the military, the police, 
the public education system, and the banking industry. These targets were chosen as they all 
represent authorities and important institutions in the United States socio-political system. The 
four pairs of traits included trust and distrust, confident and skeptical, fair and unfair, and 
satisfied and unsatisfied. These traits represent important components of the perception of 
legitimacy as conceptualized by psychologists and political scientists (Tyler & Huo, 2002; 
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Weatherford, 1992). For each individual trait, participants received the following question 
(words in brackets are altered for the other versions of the target qualities and institutions):  
How much do you [trust] the [banking industry]?  
Participants then rated their perceptions of the trait (e.g., trust) on a four-point scale with the 
labels "not at all," "slightly," "quite a bit," and "extremely."  
 To create the measure of objective ambivalence I first computed the objective measure of 
ambivalence based on the similarity-intensity model of objective ambivalence (see Thompson & 
Zanna, 1995). This conceptualization of ambivalence considers ambivalence as a joint function 
of attitude similarity and attitude intensity. That is, ambivalence is a product of the extent to 
which dominant and conflicting reactions are similar or dissimilar and the extremity of the 
reactions. Thompson and Zanna (1995) use the following formula to compute objective 
ambivalence according the similarity-intensity model: 
Attitudinal Ambivalence = [(P + N)/2] – [|P – N|] 
Where P is the participants’ score on positive items and N is the participants’ scores on the 
negative items. The first half of the equation assesses the average intensity of the components 
and the last half of the equation assesses the difference between the positive and negative 
components.  This index of ambivalence as been one of the most popular indexes and has been 
applied to a number of different topics (Armitage & Conner, 2000; Faina, Costarelli, & Romoli, 
2002; Fong, 2006; Kachadourian, Fincham, & Davila, 2005; Locke & Braun, 2009; Rudolph & 
Popp, 2007; van Harreveld, van der  Pligt, de Vries, Wenneker, & Verhue, 2004; Zemborain & 
Johar, 2007).  
 In terms of ambivalence towards system legitimacy the equation can be rewritten as: 
System Ambivalence = [(L + I)/2] – [|L – I|] 
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Where L is participants’ scores on the legitimacy items (i.e., trust, confident, fair, satisfied) and I 
is participants’ scores on the illegitimacy items (i.e., distrust, skeptical, unfair, dissatisfied). 
Objective system ambivalence was calculated with this formula for each pair of items for each of 
the seven targets and then averaged together for each of the seven targets. The measures of 
objective ambivalence for each target were averaged together to form an aggregated objective 
system ambivalence scale (α = .67). 
 Following the assessment of objective ambivalence for each target was an assessment of 
subjective ambivalence based on the measures by Priester and Petty (1996) and Newby-Clark, 
McGregor, and Zanna (2002). This measure consists of five items regarding the conflict, mixed 
emotions, and indecision felt towards the seven targets (see Table 14). These items were 
measured on both seven and five point scales. They were standardized and averaged together to 
create the final measure of subjective ambivalence for each target group. As with objective 
ambivalence, the measures of subjective ambivalence were combined to form an aggregated 
subjective system ambivalence scale (α = .64). The measures of objective and subjective 
ambivalence were correlated with one another (r[117] = .58, p < .001) , indicating that the 
measures of objective and subjective ambivalence are capturing similar, but not identical, 
constructs.  
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Table 10 
Study 4: Subjective measure of ambivalence 
 
 
I have strong mixed emotions both for and against the Supreme Court, all at the same time. (1 
disagree strongly to 7 agree strongly) 
 
I do not find myself feeling torn about my opinion of the Supreme Court; my feelings go in one 
direction only. (1 disagree strongly to 7 agree strongly) 
 
To what extent are your reactions to the Supreme Court mixed or one-sided? (1 completely one-
sided reactions to 7 completely mixed reactions) 
 
To what extent are your reactions to the Supreme Court conflicted or not conflicted? (1 feel no 
conflict at all to 5 = feel maximum conflict) 
 
To what extent are your reactions to the Supreme Court indecisive or not indecisive? (1 feel no 
indecision to 5 feel maximum indecision) 
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CHAPTER XIII 
RESULTS (STUDY 4) 
Manipulation Check 
 Participants in the unequal condition perceived more inequality (M = 5.68, SD = 1.03) 
than participants in the equal condition (M = 5.05, SD = .84), t(153) = 4.18, p < .001, d = .67. 
Similar to Study 3, even participants in the equal condition perceived the United States as 
unequal (i.e., above the midpoint of the scale). 
Hypothesis I: Objective Ambivalence 
 Hypothesis I predicts a three-way interaction between the inequality of the status quo, the 
resistance to social change, and the acceptance of inequality when predicting ambivalence, such 
that in the equal condition people who resist social change and accept inequality will be the most 
ambivalent, but in the unequal condition people who resist social change and reject inequality 
(egalitarians) will be the most ambivalent. To test this hypothesis a 2 (Status Quo: More Equal 
vs. More unequal) X continuous (resistance to social change) X continuous (acceptance of 
inequality) general linear model predicting both measures of objective and subjective 
ambivalence was computed.  
 When predicting the overall objective system ambivalence scale there was a significant 
interaction between the acceptance of inequality and the experimental condition (see Table 15 
and left panel of Figure 14). In the unequal condition there was no association between the 
acceptance of inequality and objective system ambivalence (b = -.07, SE = .05, F[1, 124] = 1.61, 
p = .21,   
  = .01); however, in the equal condition there was a significant positive association (b 
= .13, SE = .06, F[1, 124] = 4.90, p = .03,   
  = .04). That is, when the status quo was described 
as equal, people who accepted inequality expressed more objective ambivalence about the social  
 96 
Table 11. 
 
Resistance to social change, the acceptance of inequality, the experimental condition, and their 
interactions predicting subjective system ambivalence, objective system ambivalence, and system 
legitimacy. 
 
 
Objective 
System 
Ambivalence 
Subjective 
System 
Ambivalence 
Legitimacy 
 F (1, 124) F (1, 137) F (1, 124) 
Resistance to Social 
Change (R) 
1.84 1.18 3.077
+
 
Acceptance of 
Inequality (A) 
.70 1.33 .479 
Experimental 
Condition (C) 
2.37 .43 .637 
A X C 6.26* 1.09 .010 
R X C 7.07** 14.98*** .475 
R X A 1.07 5.10* 1.488 
R X A X C .01 4.73* .002 
 
Figure 14 
 
Study 4: Significant two-way interactions predicting objective system ambivalence. Left panel: 
Interaction between experimental condition and the acceptance of inequality. Right panel: 
Interaction between the experimental condition and the resistance to social change. 
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system.  
 There was also an interaction between the resistance to social change and the 
experimental condition (see Table 15 and right panel of Figure 14). In the unequal condition, 
there was a significant positive association between the resistance to social change and objective 
system ambivalence (b = .16, SE = .05, F[1, 124] = 8.98, p = .003,   
  = .07); however, there was 
no association in the equal condition (b = -.05, SE = .06, F[1, 124] = .77, p = .38,   
  = .01). That 
is, when the status quo was described as unequal people who resist social change were more 
likely to express ambivalence in the social system. These two interactions did not support the 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis I: Subjective Ambivalence 
 When predicting subjective ambivalence there were two significant two-way interactions; 
however, these interactions were all qualified by a significant three-way interaction (see Table 15 
and Figure 15). In the unequal condition there was no significant two-way interaction between 
the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality (b = .003, SE = .05, F[1, 137] = 
.004, p = .95,   
  = .00003). In this condition there was a main effect for the resistance to social 
change (b = .18, SE = .05, F[1, 137] = 13.13, p < .001,   
  = .09) and no significant effect for the 
acceptance of inequality (b = -.08, SE = .05, F[1, 137] = 2.33, p = .13,   
  = .02). In the equal 
condition there was a significant two-way interaction between the resistance to social change and 
the acceptance of inequality (b = .15, SE = .05, F[1, 137] = 8.84, p = .003,   
  = .06). For 
participants high in the acceptance of inequality there was no association between the resistance 
to social change and subjective system ambivalence (b = .05, SE = .08, F[1, 137] = .40, p = .53, 
  
  = .003). For participants low in the acceptance of inequality there was a significant negative 
association between the resistance to social change and subjective system ambivalence (b = -.26,  
 98 
Figure 15. 
 
Study 4: Significant three-way interaction predicting subjective system ambivalence. 
 
  
 
SE = .07, F[1, 137] = 13.59, p < .001,   
  = .09). That is, in the equal condition, egalitarians who 
did not resist social change were the most ambivalent. For these people who are not opposed to 
change, it appears, being in a social system that matches their goals made them feel ambivalence. 
Hypothesis II: Predicting System Legitimacy 
 I also recoded the objective system ambivalence measure to reflect system legitimacy 
(e.g., reverse coding measures of the extent a social institution was "unfair"). This allowed me to 
test the hypotheses of the first three studies in a new sample and with different measures of 
legitimacy. The results of this analysis are in Table 15. There were no significant main effects or 
interactions (all F's < 3.08, all p's > .08, all   
 's < .03). There was, however, a marginally 
significant positive association between the resistance to social change and system legitimacy (b 
= .06, SE = .04, F [1, 124] = 3.08, p = .08,   
  = .02), indicating that people who are resistant to 
social change are more likely to see societal institutions as legitimate. Although the 2D-MOSL 
does predict that people who are resistant to social change will see the social system as more 
legitimate, it also expects that legitimacy will be associated with the acceptance of inequality. 
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The latter part of the expectation did not come to fruition in the current study.  
 An additional analysis included the manipulation check scale instead of the experimental 
condition variable in the equation. This additional analysis revealed no significant main effects 
or interactions (all F's < 1.69, all p's > .19,   
 's < .02).  
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CHAPTER XIV 
DISCUSSION (STUDY 4) 
 The purpose of the fourth study was to test an additional hypothesis that can be derived 
from the 2D-MOSL, but not SJT and SDT, surrounding the possibility of conflicting system-
relevant motivations. For people who resist social change, being in a social system that conflicts 
with one's egalitarian or anti-egalitarian goals could produce psychological conflict that might 
manifest as ambivalence. Statistically this hypothesis should result in a three-way interaction 
between the resistance to social change, the acceptance of inequality, and the experimental 
condition. The fourth study tested this hypothesis using both objective and subjective measures 
of ambivalence towards the social system. This study moves past basic associations with 
legitimacy and uses the potential for system-motivation conflict to demonstrate the distinctness 
of the two system-relevant motivations.  
 The measure of objective system ambivalence produced interesting, though inconsistent, 
results. There was no significant three-way interaction; however there were two significant two-
way interactions. In the equal condition people who were high on the acceptance of inequality 
were more ambivalent compared to those who were low on the acceptance of inequality, but 
there was no effect of the acceptance of inequality in the unequal condition. Examining Figure 
14, suggests that it may be the case that people who are low on the acceptance of inequality are 
less ambivalent after receiving information that suggests that the social system supports their 
goals. That is, this may be some indication of relief. As with Study 3, manipulating information 
about participants own social systems may not have the same effects as manipulating 
information about an unknown social system. Participants likely already have ideas and 
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explanations for any disparities in their society and contrary information may be surprising or 
less believable more than informative.  
 There was also a significant two-way interaction between the resistance to social change 
and the equality of the status quo. In the equal condition the resistance to social change was not a 
reliable predictor of system ambivalence. In the unequal condition, however, people high on the 
resistance to social change were significantly more ambivalent about the social system than 
people low on the resistance to social change. Before interpreting this effect, it is important to 
remember that (a) this effect is found at the average level of the acceptance of inequality variable 
and (b) on average people were relatively egalitarian (M = 2.50 on a scale with a possible range 
from 1 to 7). With this in mind, it appears that people with average levels of egalitarianism, who 
were in the unequal condition, and who were high on the resistance to social change expressed 
the most objective ambivalence towards the social system--a pattern of results consistent with 
my predictions. Unfortunately for the purposes of the this study, egalitarians are well represented 
in the sample of participants and thus it may not be possible to fully and effectively test the 
three-way interaction predicted by the model. 
 When looking at the measure of subjective system ambivalence I did find a significant 
three-way interaction; however, the pattern of results was not consistent with the predictions 
from the 2D-MOSL. In the unequal condition, I predicted that people high on the resistance to 
social change and low on the acceptance of inequality would be the most ambivalent. In the left 
panel of Figure 15, it is possible to see that participants that fit these criteria were typically 
higher in ambivalence, but the difference between people high and low on the acceptance of 
inequality was not significant. However,  people "high" on the acceptance of inequality were 
plus one standard deviation of the acceptance of inequality mean. Because the mean on this 
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variable reflects a number of committed egalitarians, people high on the acceptance of inequality 
are still actually below the midpoint of the scale (3.52). Thus, in a sample with a broader set of 
views on the acceptability of inequality the expected pattern of results may have emerged in this 
condition. 
 In the equal condition there was a significant two-way interaction between the resistance 
to social change and the acceptance of inequality when predicting subjective system 
ambivalence. This two-way interaction was primarily driven by people low on the acceptance of 
inequality. For these individuals, when they were low on the resistance to social change they 
experienced ambivalence about the social system. It may be that when people who are used to a 
social system that conflicts with their goals (e.g., egalitarians in the unequal United States) and 
promote change in that social system (e.g., people low on the resistance to social change) they 
feel conflict when they are given information about the social system that conflicts with their 
established perceptions of the system. When they were high on the resistance to social change 
they had very low levels of ambivalence. That is, when the social system matched egalitarians' 
goals and they like social change they felt ambivalence about the social system. When the social 
system matched egalitarians' goals and they resist social change and they experienced very little 
ambivalence. The latter effect is consistent with predictions. I would not expect people to feel 
ambivalent about the social system when the social system matches their goals and they are not 
resistant to change.  
 Finally, the current study was also able to reexamine the hypotheses tested in the first 
several studies by recoding the measure of objective system ambivalence to be a measure of 
system legitimacy. Similarly to the analysis of system legitimacy from Study 3, there was not 
broad support for the hypotheses; however, there was a small relationship between the resistance 
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to social change and the legitimacy of the social system indicating that people who resist social 
change are more likely to see to the social system as legitimate. There were not, however, any 
other associations with system legitimacy in the study. Although not consistent with the 2D-
MOSL, this effect is conceptually consistent with work from SJT (Jost et al., 2004) in that the 
resistance to social change (marginally) predicted legitimacy. 
 In sum, although there was not any broad support for the predictions of the 2D-MOSL, 
there were some promising patterns. First, if the sample contained a broader range of people on 
the acceptance of inequality dimension, it may have been possible for some supportive results to 
emerge for the predictions surrounding system ambivalence. Second, the resistance to social 
change predicted system legitimacy, consistent with predictions from the model. As with the 
previous studies, the current study suggests several future directions for studies testing the model 
(see next chapter). 
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CHAPTER XV 
DISCUSSION 
 I proposed a 2D-MOSL and tested hypotheses derived from this model in four sets of 
studies. One primary prediction of the model is that the resistance to social change and the 
acceptance of inequality will simultaneously predict legitimacy in unequal systems. Consistent 
with this expectation, both system-relevant motivations predicted legitimacy in equal countries 
even while controlling for the other system-relevant motivation (Studies 1, 2a, & 3). That is, both 
motivations contributed to explaining unique variance in legitimacy which indicates that they are 
not merely redundant with one another.  The second primary prediction argues that the resistance 
to social change will be related to the legitimacy of the social system no matter the inequality of 
the status quo, but the association between acceptance of inequality and legitimacy will be 
moderated by societal inequality. Clear support for this hypothesis was found in Studies 1 and 2a 
find that the resistance to social change is associated with legitimacy across societies, but the 
acceptance of inequality is only related to legitimacy in unequal societies. There were even 
instances when the acceptance of inequality was associated with illegitimacy in more equal 
contexts (see Study 1). Support for the two primary predictions indicate that the two system-
relevant motivations are not identical and represent two different motivations to legitimize the 
social system. 
 In addition to these the primary predictions, several additional hypotheses were tested. In 
Study 2b I tested the hypothesis that people will legitimize social systems that match their 
system-relevant motivations whether those motivations are the acceptance of inequality (e.g., 
Study 1 and Study 2a) or the resistance to social change (Study 2b). In this study I manipulated 
the extent a society was described as consistently changing or very unlikely to change. 
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Consistent with my hypotheses, the resistance to social change was associated with system 
legitimacy, but only in the condition where it matched the goal to resist social change. That is, 
only in the "unlikely to change" experimental condition.  In this study, there was also an 
unexpected interaction between the experimental condition and the acceptance of inequality, 
such that the acceptance of inequality was positively associated with system legitimacy in the 
unlikely to change experimental condition (and no association in the ever-changing experimental 
condition). This unexpected effect warrants further investigation. I believe there are at least two 
possibilities for this effect that could be tested. First, people may be using the possibility of 
change as a heuristic for the levels of inequality within the social system. Second, people who 
are high on the acceptance of inequality may desire inequality as a way of maintaining societal 
stability, and so a stable society unlikely to change may also be seen as fulfilling goals related to 
the acceptance of inequality.  
 This is an important possibility because it suggest that the acceptance of inequality and 
the resistance to social change may not be strictly orthogonal. That is, there may be an 
asymmetry between the acceptance of inequality and the resistance to social change, such that 
the acceptance of inequality is reliant on some form of stability for legitimacy, whereas the 
resistance to social change can be associated with legitimacy regardless of the levels of 
inequality. This does not mean that the two constructs are identical, nor does it mean that they 
cannot be treated as theoretically orthogonal for the purposes of developing hypotheses and 
considering the psychological consequences of different combinations of the two system-relevant 
motivations. Rather, this indicates that we may (and do) find instances where the resistance to 
social change and the acceptance of inequality are related. This possibility is consistent with 
factor analytic results previously described. These analyses used an oblimin rotation which 
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means that the factors were allowed to correlate, rather than the forced orthogonality of oblique 
rotations methods (e.g., varimax rotation). Similarly, across the studies the acceptance of 
inequality and the resistance to social change were typically weakly or moderately correlated. 
These suggest that the two motivations can be correlated, but because of the separate factor 
loadings and only moderate correlations it does not suggest that these two motivations are 
identical. Future work will need to test the limits of the assumed orthogonality of the 2D-MOSL 
and include measures that assess the extent people adopt acceptance of inequality beliefs because 
of the functional benefits of inequality. It will also be important to determine what strengthens or 
weakens the relationship between the two system-relevant motivations. 
 In Study 3 I attempted to expand on the 2D-MOSL in several ways. First, I attempted to 
experimentally manipulate both of the system-relevant motivations, but this was not successful 
and so the analyses relied on the measured variables. There are many reasons the manipulations 
may have failed. For example, given the current economic downturn participants may have 
habituated to a chronic state of system threat or, perhaps, the manipulations only produce small 
effects that are unlikely to emerge reliably.
5
 Second, I attempted to expand the 2D-MOSL to 
perceptions of racial intolerance. Recently, Kay and colleagues (Kay et al., 2009) demonstrated 
that when people are motivated to justify the social system and the social system is perceived as 
unequal they are more likely to see inequality as justified and to express  intolerance towards the 
low status group, whereas when the social system is perceived as more equal they are less likely 
to see inequality as justified and to express tolerance. I expected similar results for the resistance 
to social change, but found either null results (racial employment tolerance) or results 
inconsistent (the measure of symbolic racism) with the predictions. The low levels of variability 
                                                          
5
 I recently discovered that the system threat manipulation was not effective for participants in a large nationally 
representative sample of adults (Wakslak & Jost, 2005). 
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in the racial employment tolerance measure may have contributed to these results because very 
few participants were willing to express anything less than full tolerance. The theoretical 
conceptualization of symbolic racism likely contributed to these results because it represents a 
form of racism that blends the resistance to social change, the acceptance of inequality, and the 
denial of racial inequality. Participants who scored highest on the measure of symbolic racism 
were people with higher levels of these three theoretical components of symbolic racism..  
 Moreover, it appears that although people responded to the manipulation checks as 
expected, the manipulations of the inequality of the status quo did not make a significant 
difference on the dependent variables and did not interact with any of the predictor variables. 
This latter issue is likely the most significant. People spend most, if not their entire lives in their 
society. Discrete manipulations regarding the inequality of their social system may not be 
enough to trigger the psychological processes hypothesized by the 2D-MOSL because people are 
chronically adapting, rationalizing, and reacting to their societal circumstances. This is an 
important issue moving forward as the relative importance of chronic versus discrete impressions 
of inequality and the state of the society make a significant difference in the design of future 
studies. With the results of Study 3 and 4 in mind, it seems that future studies may be better 
spent on accurately assessing people perceptions of their own societal systems rather than trying 
to manipulate these perceptions. Another option may be to try manipulating system-issues that 
are less well known and people have less well-formed opinions about. However, when trying to 
identify causal pathways the modified hypothetical societies paradigm used in Study 2 may be 
more effective. 
 Study 4 explored the possibility of conflicting system-relevant motivations, with the 
prediction that conflicting motivations would lead to greater ambivalence about the social 
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system. There was some tentative support for this hypothesis; however, the student sample used 
in Study 4 had very little variation on the acceptance of inequality measure, with a large majority 
of the sample scoring on the egalitarian side of the scale. A more heterogeneous sample will be 
necessary to more accurately test my hypotheses. An additional variation in Study4 that could 
prove to be consequential is the different method of measuring system legitimacy. In Study 4, 
system legitimacy was measured by aggregating unipolar measures of trust and distrust, fairness 
and unfairness of a number of societal institutions with the assumption that by aggregating these 
perceptions it is possible to get a sense of participants' perceptions of the overall social system. 
However, this assumption may not be correct. Some societal institutions may be more or less 
representative of the overall system and this may depend on the individual participant and the 
salient societal conditions of the moment. Additionally, by combining the four point unipolar 
measures important variance in the final measure of legitimacy may be obscured.  Finally, 
although less satisfying theoretically, it any sets of studies with small to medium effect sizes, 
some instances of non-significance are expected by chance (e.g., Francis, 2012, in press). 
 It is important to consider whether the results not anticipated by the 2D-MOSL can be 
interpreted through the lenses of SJT and SDT. Interestingly, because many of the secondary 
predictions were attempting to directly build on the research traditions of SJT and SDT, results 
that were not predicted by the 2D-MOSL are also inconsistent with these previous theories. For 
example, both SJT and SDT predict status asymmetries in legitimacy, such that the relationship 
between system-relevant ideologies and motivations will be weaker predictors of legitimacy for 
low compared to high status groups. No support was found for this hypothesis (see Study 1). It 
may be possible to integrate the results that did emerge with some form of SJT or SDT, but only 
via an ad-hoc reconceptualization of the theories. Similarly, the unexpected interaction between 
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the amount the society changes and the accpetnace of inequality in Study 2b is not easily 
incorporated in SDT. SDT conceptualizations the acceptance of inequality around themes of 
heirarchy, dominance, and the subordination of low status groups--these themes are not 
immediately indicative of stability. In Study 3, I attempted to replicate and extend the work by 
Kay and colleagues (2009); however, I was unable to replicate their results. Instead, the 
manipulation of the status quo did not have an effect on racial tolerance, whereas the resistance 
to social change and the acceptance of inequality both had independent effects on racial 
tolerance. These independent effects are consistent with the 2D-MOSL. Finally, although the 
ambivalence pattern of results from Study 4 were not anticipated by the 2D-MOSL, both SJT and 
SDT do not allow for conflicting system-relevant motivations within their framework and so do 
not make any predictions for this particular study. Thus, the results consistent with the primary 
predictions of the 2D-MOSL are unique to the 2D-MOSL and the unsupported predictions 
suggest shortcomings of SJT and SDT, along with the 2D-MOSL. 
SJT vs. SDT vs. 2D-MOSL: Theoretical Contributions 
 One of the primary contributions of this document is theoretical. Social dominance and 
system justification theories have provided much of the theoretical guidance when it comes to 
questions about the stability of social systems (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Sidanius & Pratto, 
1999)--especially social systems that seem de facto unjust (to liberal academics, at least). These 
two theoretical perspectives have also been considered analogous and researchers have used both 
theories to make the same predictions. The 2D-MOSL, however, argues that these perspectives 
each capture a unique motivation for perceiving a social system as just and legitimate. System 
justification theory has primarily uncovered the motivation to resist social change, whereas 
social dominance theory has primarily uncovered the motivation to accept inequality. By 
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considering these two dimensions as independent and theoretically orthogonal it is possible for 
the 2D-MOSL to make unique predictions about when people will see their social systems as 
legitimate and what motivations will be associated with legitimacy under what circumstances.  
 To demonstrate the value of a new theory the new theory must either be more 
parsimonious than existing theories, or it must explain data not adequately explained by existing 
theoretical perspectives. On the surface the 2D-MOSL is not more parsimonious than either SJT 
or SDT. The 2D-MOSL proposes two, rather than one, important system-relevant motivations 
and thus increases the complexity of the model compared to SJT and SDT. However, 
parsimonious does not need be limited to the complexity of individual theories and can also be 
extended to the parsimony of a scientific field. This "meta-theoretical" parsimony is the idea that 
a particular field only has as many theories as it needs. In this sense the 2D-MOSL is more meta-
theoretically parsimonious because it reduces the total number of theories necessary for the 
social psychological study of legitimacy. 
 The 2D-MOSL also accounts for patterns of data better than either SJT or SDT. SJT 
argues that the acceptance of inequality is a form of system justification that serves to maintain 
the status quo. From this perspective we would expect two things. First, that the acceptance of 
inequality would be associated with legitimacy of the status quo, no matter the status quo. 
Second, because the two system-relevant motivations are serving the same goal, when entered 
into a multiple regression equation one of the motivations should dominate the other (i.e., their 
shared, rather than unique, variance is what predicts legitimacy). SDT argues that SJT is 
subsumed by SDT and so SJT is in the service of maintaining inequality. From this perspective 
we would also expect two things. First, that the resistance to social change would be associated 
with legitimacy in unequal contexts, but not necessarily equal contexts. Second, and similar to 
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the second point above, because the two system-relevant motivations are serving the same goal, 
when entered into a multiple regression equation one of the motivations should dominate the 
other. 
 There are several patterns of data  in the current studies that are not predicted by either 
SJT and SDT, but is predicted by the 2D-MOSL.  In Study 1 and Study 2a, in unequal contexts, 
the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality were both associated with 
legitimacy. That is, their unique, unshared variance predicted legitimacy above and beyond their 
shared variance indicating that they are separate motivations. This is inconsistent with theories 
that suggest that the motivations are in the service of the same goal. In these two studies, in equal 
contexts, the resistance to social change was still associated with legitimacy, but the acceptance 
of inequality was either unrelated or negatively related to legitimacy. If the two motivations were 
in the service of the same goal they would have the same moderators; however, this is clearly not 
the case. Moreover, the acceptance of inequality is clearly not always in the service of the status 
quo because there are times when it is associated with challenging the legitimacy of the social 
system. This pattern of data is difficult to explain with SJT or SDT, but is easily accounted for by 
the 2D-MOSL, which both integrates and contextualizes the predictions of system justification 
and social dominance theories. 
 This does not mean that SJT and SDT do not have any value. For example, the consistent 
association between the acceptance of inequality and racial intolerance is easily anticipated by 
both SDT and the 2D-MOSL. In this specific case the SDT may be the most parsimonious 
explanation; however, if one takes a broader view of all the data available in the current studies 
SDT does not explain any of the results beyond those covered by the 2D-MOSL and the 2D-
MOSL explains several additional patterns of data. Thus, the sum total of the data suggests that 
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the 2D-MOSL more effectively captures the patterns of data while introducing meta-theoretical 
parsimony. 
 SJT and SDT also have trouble explaining the diversity of political protests observed 
throughout the world. If the acceptance of inequality is in the service of resisting social change, 
then it is difficult for SJT to explain instances when people who are accepting of inequality 
demand large scale social change. Two recent examples highlight this issue. In Norway, Anders 
Breiviki committed a mass murder of children at a summer camp that encouraged tolerance and 
acceptance (Muhammad, 2011). Anders Breiviki committed this atrocity as an act of political 
protest against the tolerance of the Norwegian government and society, essentially arguing that 
the Norwegian status quo is too egalitarian. The second example comes from another typically 
tolerant western European country, the Netherlands. Currently Geert Wilders is a prominent 
politician in the Netherlands who is advocating for large scale social changes that would change 
the immigration laws in the Netherlands in a way that is only in the service of native Dutch 
people (BBC, 2011; Crouch, 2008). If the acceptance of inequality is in the service of resisting 
social change, then it is not clear how or why Anders Breiviki or Geert Wilders would adopt 
political positions that are in opposition to the status quo in their countries. Rather, in terms of 
the 2D-MOSL, Breiviki and Wilders are likely low on the resistance to social change and high 
on the acceptance of inequality. In an more equal social system the 2D-MOSL predicts people 
with these characteristics will be the most likely to protest.
6
 Although all three theories can 
explain the protests in the more unequal uprisings of the recent Arab Spring movement (e.g., 
                                                          
6
 SJT theory might argue that both of these people are fighting for the traditional past and so are really resisting 
social change. However, by allowing the resistance to change to be defined in this way means that only people who 
advocate for progressive change can score low on the resistance to social change. To me it seems problematic to 
build unnecessary ideological bias into a construct. 
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protesters are likely egalitarians who are low on the resistance to social change), the protest 
movements in more egalitarian countries that are more difficult for SJT and SDT to explain. 
 The current set of studies also suggests an opportunity to further broaden and generalize 
the 2D-MOSL. Putting aside the ineffectual manipulation of inequality in Studies 3 and 4, the 
results of these four studies could be predicted by the simple premise that people will legitimize 
social systems that uphold their goals. For example, people who value inequality legitimize 
unequal social systems, people who value equality legitimize equal social systems, and people 
who devalue social change legitimize social systems that are unlikely to change. People may 
perceive their social systems on a number of other dimensions beyond those related to inequality 
and social change. For example, citizens may be particularly concerned about the levels of 
meritocracy, the success of the education system, or the incorporation of religion into public life. 
When a social system fails to live up to their standards, the social system may not be seen as 
legitimate. This implies a theory of "system-discrepancy", building off of the logic of self-
discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987), which predicts that people will legitimize a social system 
when their views of how the system actually is matches their view of how the system ought to be 
or should be. Ought-actual and should-actual discrepancies may lead to delegitimization and 
perhaps protest  against the current state of affairs. This system-discrepancy perspective could 
provide additional avenues for future research. For example, a system-discrepancy account 
would require more idiographic measures that take into account the many different dimensions 
people might use to evaluate social systems. It may also be the case, as with self-discrepancy 
theory, that ought-actual discrepancies are more consequential than should-actual discrepancies 
because ought-actual discrepancies are indicative of a moral difference. 
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Conclusion 
 The 2D-MOSL combines unique predictions and past insights from SJT and SDT in 
order to understand the legitimization of just and unjust social systems. Although the results of 
the studies were not perfect, the results of the primary predictions indicate that the 2D-MOSL 
can provide a more nuanced view of system legitimacy than previous perspectives that takes into 
account societal factors, individual factors, and their interactions. By considering legitimacy in 
diverse contexts it is possible to integrate, distinguish, and go beyond previous theoretical 
perspectives on the legitimacy of social systems. 
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CHAPTER XVI 
SUMMARY 
 Two theories, system justification theory (SJT) and social dominance theory (SDT), both 
attempt to explain the prevalence and stability of unequal social systems and are often consider 
analogous by their proponents.  With the newly proposed Two Dimensional Model of System 
Legitimacy (2D-MOSL), I argue that each theory captures a dimension of system relevant 
motivations: the resistance to social change (RSC), has primarily been studied by SJT and ranges 
on a continuum from the resistance to the acceptance of social change and the acceptance of 
inequality (AOI), has primarily been studied by SDT and ranges on a continuum from the 
acceptance to the rejection of inequality. The 2D-MOSL predicts that both of these dimensions 
will be independently associated with the legitimacy of the social system, indicating that they are 
not analogous system-relevant motivations. Results were largely consistent with this expectation 
(Studies 1, 2a, & 3) 
 The 2D-MOSL also lends itself to a number of additional predictions. The AOI should be 
associated with legitimacy only in cases when the society upholds the goal of inequality. As 
expected, the AOI was negatively or nonsignificantly related to legitimacy in more equal 
European countries (Study 1) and an unnamed equal country (Study 2), but positively related in 
more unequal comparison countries. The RSC, however, should not depend on the inequality of 
the country and so is related to legitimacy no matter the inequality of the status quo (Studies 1 
and 2a). Study 2b revealed that the RSC predicted legitimacy in stable societies, but not in 
societies with ever changing cultural values. Taken together, these studies indicate that people 
legitimize social systems when it matches their motivations related to inequality and social 
change. 
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 Study 3 attempted to extend the theory to measures of racial intolerance, expecting that 
the AOI would consistently predict intolerance, whereas the RSC would predict intolerance 
when the status quo is portrayed as unequal compared to when it is portrayed as more equal (see 
Kay et al., 2009). Although both RSC and AOI predicted racial intolerance the manipulation of 
the inequality of the status quo did not moderate any of the associations.  
 Study 4 proposed that there are situations where the AOI and RSC conflict, especially for 
people high on the RSC. People in an unequal system who are high on the RSC and low on the 
AOI could feel conflict because these individuals disagree with the overall structure of the 
society, but yet disavow the change needed to rectify the situation. In Study 4, I tested whether 
this conflict resulted in feelings of ambivalence across measures of subjective and objective 
system ambivalence. The results indicated that people did experience system ambivalence and 
that this ambivalence varied depending on participants AOI and RSC and the inequality of the 
status quo; however, the precise individuals expects to exhibit the highest levels of ambivalence 
did not emerge. Instead it appeared that people who are used to being antagonistic to the system 
greatly reduced their ambivalence when they were given information that suggested the system 
was in line with their own goals. 
 In sum, results were supportive of the primary predictions of the 2D-MOSL indicating 
that it may be a viable integration of SJT and SDT, but less supportive of the many different 
secondary predictions.  
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The Acceptance of Inequality and Tradition Pretest 
 To see if the proxy measures of the acceptance of inequality and the resistance to social 
change from the ESS tap into these concepts, 83 undergraduates completed a pre-test for partial 
course credit. Participants completed seven items for the resistance to social change (see Table 
1A). Five of the items are modified from Oreg’s (2003) measure of resistance to change in 
organizational settings. The referent of these items were altered to reflect society at large rather 
than a particular organizational or work context. For example, an item from the original scale 
reads “If I were to be informed that there’s going to be a significant change regarding the way 
things are done at work, I would probably feel stressed.” The same item modified to measure the 
resistance to social change reads “If I were informed that there’s going to be significant societal 
changes, I would probably feel stressed.” Two additional items from previous studies were also 
used. The item “I would be reluctant to make any large-scale changes to the social order” was 
used by Jost and colleagues (Jost et al., 2007) as a measure of the resistance to social change. 
The item “Being virtuous and law-abiding is in the long run better for us than permanently 
challenging the foundation of our society” is from the conventionalism factor of Funke’s version 
of the right-wing authoritarianism scale. The other items within this factor did not seem to 
capture the construct of the resistance to social change, so they were not used.
7
 The seven items 
can be found in Table 1A. These seven items were averaged together to create a reliable scale (α 
= .76). 
The acceptance of inequality was measured with the 16-item social dominance 
orientation scale (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). The items that make up this scale 
                                                          
7
 The three items not used from this conventionalism factor are “The withdrawal from tradition will turn out to be a 
fatal fault one day,” “People should develop their own personal standards about good and evil and pay less attention 
to the Bible and other old, traditional forms of religious guidance,” and “Homosexual long-term relationships should 
be treated as equivalent to marriage.” 
 139 
can be found in Table 1A. They were averaged together to form a highly reliable scale (α = .90). 
Items assessing both the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality were 
measured on a seven-point scale with the labels disagree strongly, disagree moderately, disagree 
slightly, neither agree nor disagree, agree slightly, agree moderately, and agree strongly. 
Participants also completed the two items from the ESS using the same wording and scale 
as the ESS. 
 Factor Analysis. Exploratory factor analysis was used to further understand the measure 
of the resistance to social change because this measure was specifically created for this set of 
studies. Principle axis factoring of the seven items revealed one factor that accounted for  36.63 
percent of the variance. All items had loadings ranging from .34 to .77. A second principle axis 
factor analysis with oblimin rotation was run using items from both the resistance to social 
change and the acceptance of inequality scale to demonstrate that the resistance to social change 
is a separable construct from the acceptance of inequality. This analysis revealed two factors 
accounting for 33.59 and 10.38 percent of the variance. The factor loadings from the pattern 
matrix are presented in Table 1A. The first factor represents the measure of the acceptance of 
inequality (i.e., the social dominance orientation scale). The second factor contains all seven 
items of the resistance to social change (loadings range from  .39 to .61). Moreover, although 
there are very few items that cross-over from one factor to another, one item loaded weakly on 
both factors ("Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.") and one  items loaded 
strongly on Factor 1 while weakly loading on Factor 2 ("Inferior groups should stay in their 
place."). These exceptions suggest that there may be some overlap between the measures, but 
that any overlap is due to social dominance orientation items rather than the resistance to social 
change items. Overall, the measure of the resistance to social change appears to represent one  
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Table 1A 
Principle axis factor analysis with direct oblimin rotation reveals two factors for the acceptance 
of inequality and the resistance to social change items.  
 
Factor 1 
Acceptance of 
Inequality 
Factor 2 
Resistance to 
Social Change 
Resistance to Social Change Items   
I would be reluctant to make any large-scale changes to the social order. -.012 .606 
I generally consider social changes to be a negative thing.  .237 .504 
If I were to be informed that there’s going to be significant societal 
changes, I would probably feel stressed.  
-.047 .521 
Societal changes seem like a real hassle to me. .079 .400 
Often, I feel a bit uncomfortable even about social changes that may 
potentially improve my life. 
-.092 .700 
I tend to resist social change even if I think the change may ultimately 
benefit me. 
-.039 .772 
Being virtuous and law-abiding is in the long run better for us than 
permanently challenging the foundation of our society.  
-.003 .386 
Social Dominance Orientation Items   
Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups. .288 .300 
In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against 
other groups. 
.383 .262 
It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others. .575 .247 
To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups. .423 .206 
If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems. .592 .209 
It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other 
groups are at the bottom. 
.738 .002 
Inferior groups should stay in their place. .571 .312 
Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place. .533 .287 
It would be good if groups could be equal. -.843 .171 
Group equality should be our ideal. -.742 -.040 
All groups should be given an equal chance in life. -.692 -.075 
We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups. -.685 .035 
Increased social equality is beneficial to society. -.698 -.004 
We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally. -.677 .070 
We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible. -.484 .133 
No group should dominate in society. -.625 .155 
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factor that is distinct from the acceptance of inequality. It is important to note that this latter 
factor analysis should only be considered preliminary because the sample size was smaller than 
ideal for a factor analysis including 23 items (see e.g., MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang, & Hong, 
1999). 
 Correlational analyses revealed that, as would be expected in a relatively unequal country 
like the United States, the measure of the resistance to social change was positively correlated 
with the acceptance of inequality (r[81]=.38, p<.001). Consistent with theories that argue that the 
resistance to social change is a component of political conservatism (e.g., Jost et al., 2003), the 
measure was marginally associated with political conservatism (r[81]=.21, p=.06).
8
 The measure 
was uncorrelated with gender, father's education, mother's education, and family income (all r's < 
|.10|, all p's > .37).
9
 In sum, these analyses provide initial evidence that the measure has both 
convergent and discriminate validity.  
 Pre-test Results. Consistent with expectations, the ESS equality value was negatively 
associated with the acceptance of inequality (r[81]=-.63, p<.001) and was unrelated to the 
tradition item (r[81]=-.10, p=.36). Unexpectedly, the resistance to social change was not 
correlated with tradition (r[81]=.12, p=.30) and it was correlated with equality values (r[81]=-
.40, p<.001). This latter association appears to be largely the result of the correlation between the 
resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality. Controlling for this correlation 
reduces the association between the resistance to social change and equality values (pr[80]=-.22, 
p=.05), but leaves the association between the acceptance of inequality and equality values 
largely intact (r[80]=-.56, p<.001).  
 Because the equality values appear to be measuring the acceptance of inequality, the 
                                                          
8
 Political conservatism was measured on a seven-point scale ranging from strong liberal to strong conservative. 
9
 Family income was measure on a nine-point scale ranging from under $20,000 to $160,000 and over. Both parental 
education variables were measured on a six-point scale ranging from No degree earned to Doctoral degree. 
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analyses for Study 1 moved forward. Caution should be used when interpreting the results of the 
tradition variable. Although this variable has represented the resistance to social change in the 
past (Thorisdottir et al., 2007), it is not clear that this item represents the resistance to social 
change in the sample of university students who completed the pre-test. 
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APPENDIX B 
Study 3 Manipulations of System Threat and System Competition 
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System Threat X System Competition Scenarios and Instructions (Study 3) 
 
For the next portion of the study we are interested in how people read and interpret stories 
in the news. The following passage is a brief excerpt of a larger story written by a British 
journalist on a recent trip to the United States.  
 
Read the passage as many times as necessary to become familiar with it. You will be 
expected to answer questions about this passage later in the study.  
 
[High system-threat / High Competition] 
 
…These days, many people in the United States feel disappointed with the 
nation’s condition. Many citizens feel that the country has reached a low point in 
terms of social, economic, and political factors. Because of these social, 
economic, and political threats, groups within the United States compete and take 
more power and resources from one another… 
 
[High system-threat / Low Competition] 
 
…These days, many people in the United States feel disappointed with the 
nation’s condition. Many citizens feel that the country has reached a low point in 
terms of social, economic, and political factors. Because of these social, 
economic, and political threats, groups within the United States work together and 
share power and resources with each other… 
 
[Low system-threat / High Competition] 
 
…These days, despite the difficulties the nation is facing, many people in the 
United States feel safer and more secure relative to the past. Many citizens feel 
that the country is relatively stable in terms of social, economic, and political 
factors. Because of these social, economic, and political successes, groups within 
the United States compete and take more power and resources from one another 
…  
 
[Low system-threat / Low Competition] 
 
…These days, despite the difficulties the nation is facing, many people in the 
United States feel safer and more secure relative to the past. Many citizens feel 
that the country is relatively stable in terms of social, economic, and political 
factors. Because of these social, economic, and political successes, groups within 
the United States work together and share power and resources with each other …  
 
 
  
 
